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DISCOVERY IN ILLINOIS AND
FEDERAL COURTS
By ROBERT G. JOHNSTON*
INTRODUCTION

The term discovery refers to the aggregate of pre-trial devices (other than the pleadings) by which facts are obtained and
recorded in a judicial proceeding.' Though virtually unknown
at common law and of limited scope in equity,2 discovery today
complements and to some extent supplants the functions and
procedural devices of the common law trial. The common law
trial is by tradition an adversary proceeding.' It is now clearly
seen as an adversary proceeding in which is undertaken a "search
for truth."'4 The adversaries, each of whom has full knowledge
of all relevant facts, introduce these facts before an impartial
trier of fact, in a manner most favorable to their position. From
the facts introduced, the trier of fact determines the existent
facts and the inferential facts; to these it applies the appropriate
rules of law in order to arrive at its decision or verdict. Underlying the process is the principle that an impartial trier of fact,
who is fully advised of the facts in question, is in the best position to determine "truth" - that ultimate fact which is the
truth for that particular case.
In order for the verdict to be arrived at fairly, two conditions must be met. First, there must be mutual knowledge of
all relevant facts,5 so that all such facts may be presented to the
trier of fact. Second, there must be appropriate procedural devices so that such facts may be presented in an orderly manner.
In the past, regulations of pleading and rules of evidence aimed
* Faculty, The John Marshall Law School. The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable and unflagging assistance of John S. Pacocha, of
the student staff of The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure.
1 "A judicial proceeding is the course of conduct set in motion when a
case is brought before a court, invoking its powers to grant remedies." C.
KELSO, A PROGRAMMED INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LAW pt. 1 at 78
(1965).
2 G. RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL ch. II

(1932).
3 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947).
4 "Excessive emphasis upon the adversary aspects of our system, and

hence upon the sporting chances of a trial, has yielded to universal recognition of the role of a trial as a search for truth." People ex rel. Noren v.
Dempsey, 10 Ill.2d 288, 293, 139 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1957) ; "By the skillful
and persuasive presentation of his case, the advocate not only serves his
client, but also the court who wants that help, who wants it put in that

way on both sides, and from that the truth will emerge."
Art of Advocacy, 50 A.B.A.J. 1121, 1124 (1964).
5Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
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at accomplishing these purposes. Under the "sporting theory"' ,
of litigation then prevalent, knowledge of facts was obtained
by pre-trial investigation and by examination of witnesses at
trial. Emphasis was placed on the frustration of mutual knowl-

edge of facts and perversion of orderly presentation of facts.
This "sporting theory"
[S]o pervaded litigation at the issue-forming stage and at the
fact-finding stage, that issues [were] confused, concealed and beclouded, and trials of issues of fact, especially before juries, [were]
permeated with elements of drama, surprise and camouflage, so
that litigation [was] universally condemned by the public, and
many agencies and devices [were] sought as substitutes.7

The devices finally settled upon to insure mutual knowledge and
orderly presentation of facts were those of discovery. They have
evolved out of the difference in presenting evidence in equity and

at law."
HistoricalDevelopment
In equity, evidence was introduced before the trier of fact
by sworn statements and by depositions. Hence, some form of
pre-trial procedure for obtaining and recording relevant material evidentiary facts was necessary. The pre-trial procedure
devised to meet these needs was the pure bill for discovery. The
procedure was initially a form of collateral relief sought within
the suit itself. It was used to obtain facts necessary to support
a claim for equitable relief. For example, a party asking for an
accounting would also collaterally ask for discovery as part of
6 Note, Monier v. Chamberlain: Work Product - Further Erosion of
the Work Product Sanctuary, 1 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 146, 148 (1967).
Harris, The Rule-Making Power, 2 F.R.D. 67, 77 (1941).
8 In England, discovery "was borrowed by the Court of Chancery, directly from the English ecclesiastical courts, - indirectly from the civil and
canon law." Langdell, Discovery under the JudicatureAct, 11 HARv. L. REV.
137, 138 (1897). The reason for the English origin occurring in Chancery
was that "[t]he first chancellors were churchmen and accordingly procedure
in courts of chancery was modelled in many respects after procedure in the
ecclesiastical courts." G. RAGLAND, JR., DIsCOvERY BEFORE TRIAL 13 (1932).
The actual origin of discovery seems to have occurred in Roman law.
"The Athenian law, while recognizing a right in the party to question his
adversary, had 'no provision for the examination of his opponent on certain
specific points, such as is known in English law as examination for discovery.' " Millar, The Mechanism of Fact-Discovery: A Study in Comparative Civil Procedure, 32 ILL. L. REV. 261, 262 n. 4 (1937), citing BONNER,
EVIDENCE IN ATHENIAN COURTS 57 (1905).
Discovery in the specific sense now in question was something unknown to the Germanic law. Because of the very nature of its proofsystem that law had no means of compelling one party to make disclosure for the benefit of the other . . . . It is, therefore, to the Roman
law that we must go for the earliest recorded use of discovery . . .the
interrogatio in iure.
That was an institution originating in the formulary period of the
Roman procedure whereby the plaintiff was enabled to interrogate a
prospective defendant, properly summoned, as to certain facts whose
ascertainment was necessary or important for the proper setting on
foot of the action.
Millar, The Mechanism of Fact-Discovery: A Study in Comparative Civil
Procedure, 32 ILL. L. REV. 261, 262-63 (1937).
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The bill was "only resorted to when the evidence

[rested] exclusively with the party called upon to disclose""i facts.
Consequently, it was limited in use to parties to the suit, and in
scope to material evidentiary facts relevant to the equitable relief
sought."
The common law had no form of pre-trial discovery. 12 Furthermore, it prohibited the calling of an adverse witness at trial. 3
Under these stringent common law limitations on obtaining and

presenting facts, a party who had a right of action was often
deprived of a remedy at law. In order to provide a remedy,
equity extended the use of pre-trial discovery in such situations, 4
through use of a bill for discovery in aid of a law action. An
equitable proceeding separate from the law action, the bill was
filed to obtain facts to support the claim for legal relief. Similar
to a pure bill for discovery, it was limited in use to parties to the
law action, 1" and in scope to material evidentiary facts relevant

to the legal relief sought.1 6

However, the bill in aid of a law

action was expanded in scope to allow the petitioner not only to
discover facts exclusively within the knowledge of the respondent, but also to discover facts within the petitioner's knowledge
7
so as to establish evidentiary admissions.'
9 The basic reason for filing a complaint asking for a discovery and
accounting, is that the complainant lacks certain knowledge and in developing the facts he may be able to obtain or discover necessary facts
and information which he does not possess.
Galinski v. Adler, 302 Ill. App. 474, 478, 24 N.E.2d 205, 207 (1939). See also
Village of Brookfield v. Pentis, 101 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1939).
"0Vennum v. Davis, 35 Ill. 568, 577 (1864).
:IShaw v. Weisz, 339 Ill. App. 630, 91 N.E.2d 81 (1.950).
12 The common law did have one form of discovery prior to trial, the
bill of particulars. It enabled a party to be apprised, prior to trial, of facts
which were necessary to be able to plead. The bill of particulars did serve
to make more certain a party's allegations in his pleadings, but it did not
enlighten the opponent as to all the relevant facts of which he needed to
be informed. See, e.g., Colby v. Wilson, 320 Ill. 416, 151 N.E. 269 (1926).
136 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1846, at 380 (3d ed. 1940).
14
Courts of law had not the power at common law to compel a
witness to give his deposition or to attend for that purpose, because
depositions were not recognized as instruments of evidence except by
consent. Courts of equity had that power because depositions were a
means by which testimony was adduced in those courts, and the power
was necessary to enable them to perform their functions.
Hill v. Thomas B. Jeffery Co., 292 Ill. 490, 494, 127 N.E. 124, 125-26 (1920).
15
Where a bill in equity is instituted in aid of a legal action, a
person who has no interest in the subject matter of the suit, and against
whom no relief is sought, cannot as a general rule properly be made a
party defendant for the purpose of discovery. The reason for these
rules is that persons not parties to the action may be examined in the
trial of the action at law as witnesses.
Moore v. Backus, 78 F.2d 571, 576 (7th Cir. 1935).
11Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 241 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
17
In bills for discovery only in aid of a lawsuit the complainant is
entitled to discovery not only in respect to facts which he cannot otherwise prove, but also as to facts the admission of which will relieve him
from the necessity of adducing proof from other sources. In other
words, a suit for discovery is proper not only when the complainant
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Because of their limited scope and uses and their cumber-

some procedures, these pre-trial discovery devices both in equity
and at law were often ineffective and expensive."' But they were
the only ones available, and the courts seemed unable to improve
on them. The courts' inability to devise effective forms of discovery by decision led eventually to legislative enactment. 19 In

both the Illinois and the federal systems, statutes were enacted
to provide for pre-trial discovery. The Illinois Chancery Act,
however, merely codified the previous system of pre-trial dis-

covery available by decision, and included all of its limitations."
On the other hand, the federal courts expanded, through their
equity rules, the discovery practices of the old equity courts.
By the Equity Rules of 1912 a radical change was effected in
the procedure of fact-discovery obtaining in the Federal Courts.
The old method of discovery by bill and answer ... was definitely
laid aside and in its place was installed that of written interrogatories separate from the bill. ... [The provision for written interrogatories] operated to cure an all pervasive evil of the old system,
and in making, as it also did, the right to propound interrogatories
a mutual one, it placed the defendant on that equal footing with the
plaintiff, which the former's pre-existing
privilege of filing a cross1
bill had fallen far short of achieving.2
therein is without other means of proof, but also in aid of his other
evidence, or even to dispense with the necessity of other evidence.
Brandenburg v. Buda Co., 299 Ill. 133, 140, 132 N.E. 514, 517 (1921).
i8 P. DYER-SMITH, FEDERAL EXAMINATIONS BEFORE TRIAL & DEPosITIONS PRACTICE §17, at 30 (1939) stated that some true form of pre-trial
discovery was necessary because the pleadings "often concealed the facts, instead of revealing them." Cf. G. RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 1-5

(1932).

19 The English courts were given authority to administer broader discovery by parliamentary act. P. DYER-SMITiH, FEDERAL EXAMINATIONS BEFORE TRIAL & DESPOSITIONS PRACTICE §17 (1939); G. RAGLAND, JR., DiSIn the United States, the Mississippi
COVERY BEFORE TRIAL 13 (1932).
legislature in the Act of February 16, 1828, provided for "an equitable petition for discovery filed as a step in the common-law cause itself." Millar,

The Mechanism of Fact Discovery: A Study in Comparative Civil Procedure,
32 ILL. L. REV. 424, 446 (1937).
20 "The Illinois Chancery Act preserves the ancient method of obtaining discovery before trial, namely, by inserting interrogatories in the chancery bill." G. RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 298 (1932). But see
Lester v. Illinois, 150 Ill. 408, 23 N.E. 387 (1890).
The evident purpose and design of this statute [ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51,
§9 (1890)] was to furnish to a party litigant a speedy and summary

mode by which, under the order of the court, to obtain written evidence
pertinent to the issue which might be in the possession and control of his
adversary, and thus obviate the necessity of a bill of discovery, seeking
the same end. It is manifest that it contemplates the production of evidence on the trial of the cause which the party applying therefor is
entitled to introduce in support of his case, and which the other party
withholds. . . . A defendant is not required to disclose matters of
evidence relied upon in the defense, and thus inform the plaintiff of
his case farther than the pleadings show. . . . [Ujnless a showing is
made, upon good and sufficient cause, that the evidence sought, or that
the books and papers required to be produced, contain evidence pertinent to the issue on behalf of the party applying therefor, the application should be denied.
Id. at 418-19, 23 N.E. at 388.

21 Millar, The Mechanism of Fact-Discovery: A Study in Comparative
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Legislation, supplemented by rules of court, has lifted the
limitations of the early decisions and codes. In Illinois, section

58 of the Civil Practice Act, giving the courts authority to administer discovery, "did away with the requirement of a separate suit and of interrogatories in the bill, and it provided that
discovery of that kind could thereafter be had by motion filed in
the cause in which the matter sought to be discovered would be
used. '22 In addition to permitting discovery to be obtained in

the same action at law, the new procedures included its use
2 3
against nonparties, a drastic departure from the prior practice.
The federal and Illinois rules of discovery, both as they were
originally enacted and in their present form,2" are "in and of the
policy which is an integral part of our present judicial system-

that of affording the fullest opportunity for exploration of an
''
opponent's case prior to trial. 25

Purposes of Discovery

The ultimate purpose of discovery, requiring as it does the
full disclosure of facts, is to increase the probability of obtaining
a fair decision on the merits of the litigation. 26 To this end discovery is compatible with the purpose of the common law trial.

It is not a rejection, but rather a refinement, of the traditional
adversary system. 27 However, to the extent that it rejects those
limitations which frustrate the purpose of the common law trial,
28
it is a rejection of the "sporting theory" of litigation.
In order to ensure their ultimate purpose, discovery devices
Civil Procedure, 32 ILL. L. REV. 261 (1937). See also J. H. Day Co. v.
Mountain City Mill Co., 225 F. 622 (E. D. Tenn. 1915).
22 Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority, 8 Ill.2d 37, 39, 132 N.E.2d 532,
534-35 (1956).
23
In our opinion the scope of the discovery authorized by section
58 (2) was not confined to that which was historically availabie in equity.
... Discovery by deposition may affect persons other than the parties
to the action, and so it was necessary that the mechanics of taking
depositions be fixed by rule.

.

.

.

By its enactment of section 58(2)

the General Assembly showed its purpose to broaden substantially the
scope of available discovery.
Id. at 40-41, 132 N.E.2d at 535.
24 FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37
(effective Sept. 16, 1938 - last amended in
1966). See also Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of
Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts Relating to Deposition
and Discovery (1967) 43 F.R.D. 211 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1967
Proposed Amendmentsi. Act of June 23, 1933, §58, Ill. Laws 58th G.A. 784
(now ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §§201-19 (1967)).
25 Coutrakon v. Distenfield, 21 Ill. App. 2d 146, 152, 157 N.E.2d 555,
558 (1959).
26 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
27 Note, Monier v. Chamberlain: Work Product - Further Erosion of
the Work Product Sanctuary, 1 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 146, 154 (1967).
28 Coutrakon v. Distenfield, 21 Ill. App. 2d 146, 152, 157 N.E.2d 555,
558 (1959).
By its enactment of section 58(2) the General Assembly showed its
purpose to broaden substantially the scope of available discovery. It
acted in response to prevailing dissatisfaction with the procedural doctrines which had exalted the role of a trial as a battle of wits and sub-
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are designed: (1) to give notice of claims and defenses and to
narrow the issues, in order to expedite and reduce the cost of

litigation; (2) to provide an adequate means of investigation, in
order to obtain facts otherwise unavailable and to avoid surprise
and perjury; (3) to record and preserve facts; and, collaterally,
29
(4) to encourage settlements.
The common law depended almost entirely upon pleadings to
give advance notice of claims and defenses of the parties and to
limit the issues.2 0 Discovery devices complement the notice func-

tion of pleadings 3 to the extent that they make available evidentiary facts not otherwise accessible. Since the facts are availa-

ble, groundless claims and defenses can be weeded out, the real
issues can be seen more clearly, and the presentation of evidence

at trial can be facilitated.32 All this, in turn, expedites litigation
and reduces its cost 33 - at least in theory. The extent to which
discovery actually does expedite litigation and reduce its cost is
open to serious doubt.34 In one case, "one interrogatory out of
ordinated its function as a means of ascertaining the truth.
Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority, 8 Ill.2d 37, 41, 132 N.E.2d 532, 535
(1956).
Pretrial discovery is designed to permit exploration and to avoid
surprise.

.

.

. It is directed toward making the judicial process one of

determining the facts appertaining to the issue and rendering a just
decision thereon, rather than the promotion of a battle of wits between
counsel.
Pink v. Dempsey, 350 Ill. App. 405, 411, 113 N.E.2d 334, 336 (1953).
29Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Note, Monier v. Chamberlain: Work Product - Further Erosion of the Work Product Sanctuary,
1 JOHN MAR.J. PRAC. & PROC. 146, 148 (1967).
30
Pleadings are designed to advise the court and the adverse parties
of the issues involved and what is relied on as a cause of action, in order
that the court may declare the law and that the adverse parties may
be prepared to meet the issues.
Yeates v. Daily, 13 Ill.2d 510, 514, 150 N.E.2d 159, 161 (1958).
31Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). "[T]he modern philosophy
of pleading . . . has reduced the requirements of the petition and left for
discovery and other pretrial procedures the opportunity to flesh out claims
and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues." Japanese War
Notes Claimants Ass'n of Phil., Inc. v. United States, 373 F.2d 356, 359 (Ct.
Cl. 1967). But cf. McCaskill, The Modern Philosophy of Pleading: A Dialogue Outside the Shades, 38 A.B.A.J. 123 (1952).
It

32

is perfectly apparent that Rules 26 to 37 . . . were formu-

lated with the intention of granting the widest latitude in ascertaining

before trial facts concerning the real issues in dispute . . . in order

to make available the facts pertinent to the issues to be decided at the
trial

.

Nichols v. Sanborn Co., 24 F. Supp. 908, 910 (D. Mass. 1938).
If a party feels that the pleading does not adequately advise him of
the claim against which he must defend, section 45 (1) of the Civil Practice Act provides for a motion to make more definite and certain, and a
bill of particulars may be sought in accordance with section 37. The
provisions for discovery in the Civil Practice Act and the Supreme
Court Rules, provide the method for obtaining information pertinent
to the litigation.
Fanning v. Lemay, 78 Ill. App.2d 166, 171-72, 222 N.E.2d 815, 817 (1966),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 38 Ill.2d 209, 222 N.E.2d 815 (1967).
a3Developments in the Law - Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940 (1961).
34 Armstrong, The Use of Pretrialand Discovery Rules: Expedition and
Economy in Federal Civil Cases, 43 A.B.A.J. 693 (1957), citing JUDICIAL

The John MarshallJournalof Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 2:22

hundreds served would have required an answer including almost
one million items. ' 3 5 In another case, "the interrogatories and
answers, nearly all printed but partly typewritten, are about
nine inches thick."3" It may well be that discovery - at least
as sometimes employed - merely shifts the cost and time of litigation from the trial itself to the pre-trial period.
To obtain facts, the common law relied on extra-judicial investigation and examination of witnesses at trial. But the effectiveness of extra-judicial investigation depends to a great extent
on the cooperation of prospective witnesses. The examination,
if any, of uncooperative witnesses is limited by the rules of evidence at trial. So discovery provides a judically sanctioned means
of investigation without all of the limitations of evidentiary rules.
As a result, discovery both increases the probability that all facts
will be presented to the judge and decreases the likelihood of
surprise 3 7 and perjury.38

"[D]iscovery of evidence before the trial has been criticized
''
as encouraging perjury to meet the discovered testimony. 13
This criticism is based on the contention that:
If discovery can be prostituted by compelling one lawyer to
furnish his adversary with signed statements of a witness prior to
COMMITTEE REPORT PROCEDURE IN
CASES (1951), 13 F.R.D. 62 (1953).

CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,

ANTI-TRUST AND OTHER PROTRACTED

35Armstrong, The Use of Pretrial and Discovery Rules: Expedition
and Economy in Federal Civil Cases, 43 A.B.A.J. 693, 695 (1957) referring
to Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 106 F. Supp. 561 (D.
Del. 1952).
36 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97, 104 (S.D.
N.Y. 1941).
.7 "Pretrial discovery
is designed to permit exploration and to avoid
surprise.

.

.

."

Pink v. Dempsey, 350 Ill. App. 405, 411, 113 N.E.2d 334,

336 (1953) ; "One advantage of discovery is the protection it gives the
adversary against surprise ...
." F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE §6.2, at
183 (1965) citing 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1845 (3d ed. 1940). But cf.
Mort v. A/S D/S Svendborg, 41 F.R.D. 225 (E.D. Pa. 1966), in which the
plaintiff propounded several interrogatories to defendant in a personal injury case to determine the extent of defendant's knowledge of plaintiff's
physical condition both before and after the occurrence on which the case
was brought. The court in striking the interrogatories stated:
[I]t is apparent that the object of these interrogatories is not to discover

facts in the discovery sense of the word, but instead to frustrate an
effective cross-examination and to avoid the possibility of impeachment.
Such was not the intent of the framers of our rules of discovery.
Id. at 227-28. See also E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416 (D. Del. 1959).
One of the defendant's objects, as has been said, in asking for these
documents is to find grounds upon which to impeach the plaintiff's experts. I do not believe that the mere hope that the records [sought]
might turn up some statements .

.

. which would be inconsistent with

some of their conclusions as to infringement would of itself be sufficient
to constitute good cause for production.
Id. at 422.
38 Ragland, Discovery Before Trial Under the Illinois Civil PracticeAct,
28 ILL. L. REV. 875, 891 (1934) ; Note, Discovery: Boon or Burden, 36 MINN.
L. REV. 364, 373 (1952).
39 Comment, Discovery: The Illinois Civil Practice Act and Iowa Procedure, 19 IowA L. REV. 589, 595 (1934), citing Report of Committee on
Legislation for 1913, 4 MASS. B. ASS'N PROC. 105 (1914).
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the witness being called to the stand, the witness, of course, will be
well prepared under the skillful guidance of unscrupulous counsel

to circumvent
his signed statement and thus avoid a charge of
4
perjury. 0

However, "[o]nly where a limited or unequal discovery obtains
has it been found that perjury, manufactured testimony, and
kindred evils are fostered."'
This consideration may well cancel out fully, over the long run,
the evil to be feared from full disclosure. The evils on both sides
are of the same kind. Both involve the chance for unscrupulous
men to commit or suborn perjury more effectively and without opportunity to meet it; and there seems to be no reason to think that
any greater
the chance invited by disclosure on the one hand is
42
than the chance protected by surprise on the other.

Another purpose of discovery is that of recording and pre-

42
serving evidence that might otherwise be unavailable at trial.

Such evidence is more likely to be recorded and preserved "while

the events . . . are fresher. ' 4 But, "in light of the informal
nature of the preliminary examination and the likelihood that
the party will say more than he would in court,

' 45

it may in fact

retard rather than advance the probability of a fair trial.

"In

a jury trial, a statement which is harmless legally may be quite
prejudicial in the minds of the jury, and the fresh, uncoached

testimony of a witness or party may be farther from the truth
than well considered testimony given at the trial. ' N 6 Proper
preparation for discovery procedures -

preparation which may

be more intense, in some cases, than the ensuing trial -

is the

prime requisite for avoiding such difficulties.

Despite the fact that "[c]ompromise settlement is not the
aim of the discovery rules[,] [t]here is a body of opinion that
'47
holds to the belief that it is a by-product of the discovery rules.
This "body of opinion" asserts that discovery aids voluntary dismissals 48 and settlements.4 9 There are differing opinions as to
4u

Hawkins, Discovery and Rule 34: What's So Wrong About Surprise?,

39 A.B.A.J. 1075, 1077 (1953).
41 G. RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 251-52 (1932).
42 F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE §6.2, at 183 (1965).
43 Developments in the Law - Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940 (1961).
44 P. DYER-SMITH, FEDERAL EXAMINATIONS BEFORE TRIAL & DESPOSITIONS PRACTICE 5 (1939).
45 Kristel v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 213 Ill. App. 518 (1919).
See also

Comment, Discovery: The Illinois Civil Practice Act and Iowa Procedure, 19
IOWA L. REV. 589, 595-96 (1934).
46

Comment, Discovery: The Illinois Civil Practice Act and Iowa Pro-

cedure, 19 IOWA L. REV. 589, 596 (1934) ; cf. "[Eixperience has shown
that compelling a witness to produce a material writing at a given stage in
the proceedings sometimes tends to prevent the discovery of truth." LaCoss v. Town of Lebanon, 78 N.H. 413, 416, 101 A. 364, 366 (1917).
47 Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389, 393 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
48 Zolla v. Grand Rapids Store Equip. Corp., 46 F.2d 319, 320 (S.D. N.Y.
1931).
49 "The party may find that he has no grounds for relief and may thus
avoid expensive litigation."
McDermott, Discovery Examination Before
Trial - History, Scope, and Practice, 21 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 3 (1936). "Set-
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the extent of discovery's contribution to dismissals or settlements.50 "A plaintiff's lawyer, unless he is awfully dumb, knows
that the average defendant, if harassed by a lawsuit, will sooner
or later throw in the sponge, and, as a business expedient, make
some kind of settlement.""t Of course, the same is true of a defendant's lawyer who abuses discovery and uses it merely as an
economic weapon to force unfair or unjust settlements. The
same advantage can be obtained, however, by the mere threat
of the trial with its attendant dangers of surprise and perjury.
No broad, organized study yet exists to support either the
validity of the purposes of discovery or the effectiveness of its
available devices.5 2 There are only the opinions and conclusions
of attorneys, judges, and academicians based on their experi-

ences. Indeed, some feel that "the subject needs 'no further
exposition in support of the rules'. ' 53 Perhaps the most persuasive argument for the use of discovery is the fact that its critics
no longer argue against its use but concentrate on issues of
proper scope and limitation.
tlements are increased. A great many cases are eliminated before they
reach the trial dockets." Ragland, Discovery Before Trial Under the Illinois
Civil Practice Act, 28 ILL. L. REV. 875, 891 (1934).
Cf. People ex rel.
Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill.2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1958).
They were adopted as procedural tools to effectuate the prompt and just
disposition of litigation, by educating the parties in advance of trial as
to the real value of their claims and defenses ...
st" It is not inconceivable that a plaintiff with serious injuries would
settle a substantial judgment because he had no knowledge of any additional rights against the insurer. Thus, to deprive an injured party
from learning of his rights against an insurer would, in effect, nullify
the benevolent purpose of such statutes.
Id. at 236-38, 145 N.E.2d at 592-93.
5O"Minnesota lawyers agree that discovery contributes to settlement
before trial but disagree as to the extent of the contribution." Note, Discovery: Boon or Burden, 36 MINN. L. REV. 365, 372 (1952).
51 Hawkins, Discovery and Rule 34: What's So Wrong About Surprise?,
39 A.B.A.J. 1075, 1076 (1953). See also Armstrong, The Use of Pretrial
and Discovery Rules: Expedition and Economy in Federal Civil Cases, 43
A.B.A.J. 693 (1957).
Certainly there are few who will deny the fact that litigation is, and
for some time has been, in the umbrella stage of appeasement or compromise, a condition which is in harmony with the spirit of our time.
Anyone who merely raises the spector with the many tools available
is almost assured of some favorable result. Instead of applying principle, settlement has become a matter of economic expediency. In fact
there have been developed even more fertile fields for what are commonly referred to as legalized blackmail or 'strike' suits despite provisions for the giving of security for costs and other precautionary measures provided by the Rules or by law.
Id. at 695-96.
52 The Project for Effective Justice of Columbia Law School has conducted a field survey of discovery and submitted its report, FIELD SURVEY
OF

FEDERAL PRE-TRIAL DIScoVERY, to the Committee on Rules of Practice

and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States. The report
is not yet published.
5 Virtue, Sweet Are the Uses of Discovery: A Reply to Mr. Hawkins,
40 A.B.A.J. 303, 303 (1954), quoting from A. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
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SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

The present scope of discovery in the Illinois and federal

courts is far broader than that formerly available in equity and
under the early statutes.5 4 The Illinois Supreme Court Rules"
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure5 generally define the
scope of discovery to include any matter relevant to the subject
matter of the pending action, unless it is precluded because of
limitations such as the requirements for "good cause," the "work
product" exemption, or the "privilege" status of confidential com5
munications. 7
The limitation of fairness - that is, allowing the more
adept adversary to retain whatever information he himself has
obtained - has been dispelled in both the Illinois and federal5 9
courts on the basis that discovery is mutually available. Under

the Illinois rules, fairness is treated strictly as a monetary consideration. "The court may apportion the cost involved in originally securing and in furnishing the discoverable material, including when appropriate a reasonable attorney's fee, in such
manner as is just." 5 In the absence of such an express provision in the federal rules, the federal courts "have ordered the
54 "Limited discovery, available only in equity, has been replaced by
comprehensive discovery available in all actions." People ex rel. Noren v.
Dempsey, 10 Ill.2d 288, 293-94, 139 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1957) ; Shaw v. Weisz,
339 Ill. App. 630, 91 N.E.2d 81 (1950); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF' THE LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS

§81 (1963).

"Except as provided in these rules, a party may obtain by discovery
full disclosure regarding any matter relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action .. . ." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201(b) (1) (1967).
56 "[A]ny matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action. . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) ; accord, 1967
Proposed Amendments, Rule 26(b)(1), 43 F.R.D. 211, 224. The proposed
amendment makes it clear that this standard applies to all discovery procedures.
57 The further limitation of protective orders gives the court broad powers to control the use of the discovery process and to prevent its abuse. It
provides the necessary flexibility to ensure that the spirit of the rules will
not be frustrated by a literal application of the rules to the prejudice of any
party or persons. For example, the courts may require using interrogatories instead of depositions; they may reschedule the time or place of
depositions; and may take appropriate measures to prevent the unnecessary
disclosure of trade secrets or other such material. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110A, §201(c); FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b); 1967 Proposed Amendments, Rule
26(c), 43 F.R.D. 211, 227. See also Antonio v. Solomon, 41 F.R.D. 447
(D. Mass. 1966). "It is clear that the scope of pretrial discovery is cir55

cumscribed by the privilege against self-incrimination.
58

.

.

. "

Id. at 449.

"We appreciate that application of the rules as here construed may

occasionally penalize diligent counsel and reward his slothful adversary.
But discovery rules work both ways .

. .

."

Monier v. Chamberlain, 35

Ill.2d 351, 361, 221 N.E.2d 410, 417 (1966).
59 "Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties
is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the
other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession." Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
60
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201(b) (2) (1967).
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.. [party seeking discovery of an adversary's expert] to pay a
portion of the expert's fees." 61
Relevance
The term "relevant" (or, more properly, "legally relevant")
is used in the law of evidence to connote admissibility at trial.
When "relevance" is used as a criterion for discovery, it is
broader than when applied to the admissibility of evidence. The
federal rule states that material need not be "legally relevant"
in terms of admissibility in order for it to be "relevant" as an
object of discovery. 2 By judicial decision Illinois has accepted
the same proposition. 3
The usual test determines whether the material sought by
discovery is "relevant" to the subject matter involved in the pending action. "Subject matter" is a broader category than the
precise issues presented by the pleadings.6 4 "'[R]elevant to the
subject matter' contemplates either evidence to be introduced at
the trial or information that may lead to the discovery of evidence to be used at the trial."6
For example, in Illinois6 6 and
the federal courts "the identity and locations of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts ' 67 is discoverable.
61 Dresser Indus. Inc. v. Doyle, 40 F.R.D. 478, 479 (N.D. Iil. 1966).
1967 Proposed Amendments, Rule 26(b)(4)(e), 43 F.R.D. 211, 226, does
contain such an express provision.
62 "It
is not ground for objection that the testimony [sought to be discovered] will be inadmissible at the trial . . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).

63, [W]e must reject at once as authority those cases limiting pretrial
discovery to matters admissible in evidence [citations omitted] as being
contrary to both the terms and intent of the Rule [former Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule
19-4(1)]." People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill.2d 231, 237, 145 N.E.2d
588, 592 (1957).
64 "Thus it is relevancy to the subject matter which is the test and
subject matter is broader than the precise issues presented by the pleadings." Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 11 F.R.D. 50, 53 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
See also People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill.2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957).
65 Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389, 393 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). See also
Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority, 8 Ill.2d 37, 132 N.E.2d 532 (1956), in
which the court stated: "'Discovery before trial' presupposes a range of
relevance and materiality which includes not only what is admissible at the
trial, but also that which leads to what is admissible at the trial." Id. at 41,
132 N.E.2d at 535.
66
[T]he statute, [ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §58(3) (1967)], protects
a party from being compelled to identify the witnesses he intends to use
at the trial, (i.e., witnesses in the technical sense), but does not preclude
discovery regarding so-called 'occurrence witnesses' (or 'persons having
knowledge of relevant facts,' as stated in Rule 19-4).
Hruby v. Chicago Transit Authority, 11 Ill. 2d 255, 258, 142 N.E. 2d 81, 83
(1957).
67 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). See also C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS §81, at 310 (1963) in which he states:
A distinction must be drawn between witnesses to the occurrences
in question, and witnesses who will be called for trial by the adverse
party. The names of occurrence witnesses may always be obtained by
discovery. It is generally held that a party is not entitled to find out,
by discovery, which witnesses his opponent intends to call at the trial,
although the court may require disclosure of this information at a pretrial conference.
The 1967 Proposed Amendments, Rule 26(b)(4)(B), 43 F.R.D. 211, 225,
does, however, provide for discovery of expert witnesses to be called at trial.
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A broader test is sometimes applied. It asks whether the
material sought to be discovered does in fact fulfill a legitimate
purpose of discovery. For example, the plaintiff in a negligence
action may seek discovery of the existence and extent of the
defendant's liability insurance coverage. In the case of People
ex rel. Terry v. Fisher" the court allowed such discovery, stating: "[I]t is our opinion that discovery interrogatories respecting the existence and amount of defendant's insurance may be
deemed to be 'related to the merits of the matter in litigation'
.. ..

"69

According to the court, discovery of the existence and

extent of coverage was "relevant" because such discovery would
facilitate and encourage settlement, one of the purposes of discovery.70 When the same question was presented for the first time
in the District Court for the District of Columbia in Cook v.
Welty, 71 Judge Holtzoff held that the plaintiff should be granted
discovery either by deposition or by interrogatories concerning
the extent of defendant's liability coverage. He cited with approval the reasoning of the Fisher case. However, the court did
note in the Cook case that the federal district courts are not in
accord on the subject and that, in fact, divergent results obtain
72
even within the same districts.
Privilege
Both the Illinois and federal rules place "privileged" material outside the scope of discovery. The federal rule merely
states that "any matter, not privileged 7 3 is subject to discovery,
without defining within the rule what is meant by "privilege."
The Illinois rule states that "[a]ll matters that are privileged
against disclosure on the trial, including privileged communica68 12 Ill.2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957).

69 Id. at 239, 145 N.E.2d at 593; cf. Saunders v. Schultz, 20 Ill.2d 301,
170 N.E.2d 163 (1960):
The Fisher case merely authorized the disclosure of liability insurance
for discovery purposes only, since such insurance is obtained in accordance with the statutory mandate for the protection of innocent victims,
and has a practical effect on the conduct of litigation. These circumstances are quite distinguishable from the instant case, where whatever
medical or hospital insurance plaintiff had was certainly not procured
for the benefit of a defendant tortfeasor, nor would such a party be
entitled to benefits of such insurance, or be relieved of liability thereby.
(Restatement of Torts, §920e).
Consequently, the trial court committed no error in sustaining plaintiff's objection to these interrogatories.
Id. at 314-15, 170 N.E.2d at 170.
7OBut see Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) : "
e
are not so sure that the giving to plaintiffs the limits of a defendant's liability insurance policy will bring about more compromise settlements than
will the withholding of such information." Id. at 393.
71 253 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C. 1966).
72 Id.
at 876 (compilation of cases by pro, con and divergent districts).
1967 Proposed Amendments, Rule 26(b)(2), 43 F.R.D. 211, 225, provides for
uniform
discovery of insurance coverage.
73
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
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tions between a party or his agent and the attorney for the party,
are privileged against disclosure through any discovery procedure. ' 7 4 Although neither rule provides complete statutory enumera tion of privileged material, decisions on both the state and
federal level have established a clearly defined concept of "privilege." It is interpreted to encompass only those confidential
relationships safeguarded by society. That is, "privilege" does
not necessarily protect material normally inadmissable at trial
because of prejudice to one of the parties in the immediate action. The word "privileged" should be applied only to those
confidential communications between parties which society deems
it necessary to maintain as confidential in order that these parties
may properly perform their functions within society.
Since the privileges afforded to certain confidential communications could amount to a suppression of evidence, four fundamental conditions must be met before any communication be
afforded a "privilege":
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
of the communications must be greater than
the benefit thereby
5
gained for the correct disposal of litigation7
In Illinois, confidential communications between a client and
his attorney are protected by the common law,7 as formerly
were confidential communications between spouses. 7 While the
attorney-client "privilege" remains in common law, the "privilege" afforded to the confidential communications between a
husband and wife is now statutory7 8 (as is the privilege of con9
psyfidential communication between physician and patient,7
80
chiatrist and patient, clergyman and parishioner,"' and accountant and clientS2).
Originally, the attorney-client "privilege"
protected the attorney; it is now retained to guarantee that a
client may consult his attorney without fearing that the attorney may be compelled in a judicial proceeding to disclose what
4 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l1OA, §201(b) (2) (1967).
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2285 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
7G6
See Dickerson v. Dickerson, 322 Ill. 492, 153 N.E. 740 (1926).
7

778 See People v. Palumbo, 5 Ill.2d 409, 125 N.E.2d 518 (1955).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §5 (1967).
79
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §5.1 (1967).

80 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §5.2 (1967).
81 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §48.1 (1967).

82 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110%/,
§51 (1967). Unlike the other "professionalclient" privileges, this privilege belongs solely to the professional, the
accountant, and does not seek to protect the 'client; see Dorfman v. Rombs,
218 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
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his client told him in confidencee1
Since the "privilege" is now
4
that of the client, it may be waived by him.
In general, the four criteria for privileged communication
quoted above obtain in the case of the attorney-client relationship. A more detailed list of prerequisites for attorney-client
"privilege" in a particular circumstance was presented by Judge
Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 5

Prior to considering whether certain particular documents were
protected by the attorney-client "privilege," he enumerated the
following conditions:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege
is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his
subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which
the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either
(i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal service or (iii) assistance in
some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing
a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b)
not waived by the client.8 6

The relation obtaining between an attorney and a corporate
87
client fits within such a framework, and indeed both in Illinois
83
Dean Wigmore teaches that the history of the attorney-client
privilege finds its origin in the reign of Elizabeth I, 'where the privilege
already appears as unquestioned.' It arose from 'a consideration for the
oath and the honor of the attorney rather than for the apprehensions of
his client.' The doctrine that the privilege was that of the attorney
rather than the client began to give way to a new concept in the 1700's.
The 'new theory looked to the necessity of providing subjectively for the
client's freedom of apprehension in consulting his legal adviser. It
proposed to assure this by removing the risk of disclosure by the attorney even at the hands of the law.' By the middle of the 1800's, the
privilege became substantially recognized as that of the client 'to include
communications made, first, during any other litigation; next, in contemplation of litigation; next, during a controversy but not yet looking
to litigation; and, lastly, in any consultation for legal advice, wholly
irrespective of litigation or even of controversy.' [Citation omitted]
The policy of the privilege has been grounded on subjective considerations since the latter part of the 1700's. 'In order to promote
freedom of consultation of legal advisers by clients, the apprehension
of compelled disclosure by the legal advisers must be removed; hence
the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's consent.
Such is the modern theory.' [Citation omitted]
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir.
1963).
84 Lanum v. Patterson, 151 Ill. App. 36 (1909). See also Burlage v.
Haudenshield, 42 F.R.D. 397 (N.D. Iowa 1967). "Discovery of privileged
matter should be allowed when waiver of the privilege at trial seems reasonably probable." Id. at 398.
85 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).

86 Id. at 358-59.
87
The fact that

the Illinois Power Company is a corporation is
immaterial for it is entitled to the same treatment under the law as
any other 'client' - no more and no less. If it seeks legal advice from
an attorney, and in that relationship confidentially communicates information relating to the advice sought it may protect itself from disclosure.
Day v. Illinois Power Co., 50 Ill. App. 2d 52, 55, 199 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1964).
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and in the federal system 8s a corporation may claim the attorneyclient "privilege." The corporate client situation, however, gives
use to a special problem: To which employees ought the "privilege" to extend? For example, the Illinois court in Day v. Illinois Power Company"9 held that the defendant corporation could
not in that particular circumstance avail itself of the attorneyclient "privilege." It stated that:
The type of corporation employee transmitting information to

the attorney for the corporation must be considered in determining
whether such information is privileged. If an employee or investigator making reports to an attorney for the corporation is in a
position to control or take a part in a decision about any action the
corporation might take upon the advice of its attorney, he personifies the corporation and when he makes reports or gives information
to the attorney, the attorney-client privilege applies. Such employee

must have actual authority, not apparent authority, to participate
in a contemplated decision. 0
That is, to retain its attorney-client "privilege," the corporation
must exercise care in selecting the person to transmit information to its attorney. This seems contrary to the general rule
that the client may select any agency he wishes, to transmit his
communication, without fear of jeopardizing his "privilege."'
In the case of People v. Ryan92 the Illinois Supreme Court
extended the rule that the client may select any agency he wishes
to transmit the communication and still maintain the "privilege."
In that case a driver involved in an automobile accident was
named as a defendant in a civil action for damages and a criminal action for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors.
The driver gave a written statement concerning the accident to
the investigator from her insurance company, which was defending the civil action. The written statement was subsequently
turned over to the attorney retained by the driver to defend the
criminal action. The prosecutor then served a subpoena on the
attorney demanding the written statement. The attorney refused to produce it since his client had invoked the attorneyclient "privilege." The attorney was declared in contempt of
court. The case was appealed directly to the supreme court on
the grounds of a substantial constitutional question but that
court, rejecting jurisdiction, transferred it to the appellate court.
The appellate court held that although the written statement
88 "It is our considered judgment that based on history, principle, precedent and public policy the attorney-client privilege in its broad sense is

available to corporations, and . . . we so hold."

Radiant Burners, Inc. v.

American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963).
8950 Ill. App. 2d 52, 199 N.E.2d 802 (1964).
90 Id. at 58, 199 N.E.2d at 806.
91 "As a general rule, a communication by a client to his attorney by any
form of agency employed or set in motion by the client is within the privilege." 97 C.J.S. Witnesses §276 (1957).
9230 Ill.2d 456, 197 N.E.2d 15 (1964).
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given to the investigator was initially clothed with the attorneyclient "privilege," since the investigator was an agent of the
insured, transmitting the communication to an attorney (yet
unchosen) in the civil action, the "privilege" was waived by
transmitting the written statement to the attorney defending the
criminal action. The Illinois Supreme Court reversing the judgment, stated:
We think the rationale of those cases upholding the privileged

nature of communications between insured and insurer where the

insurer is under an obligation to defend is more persuasive. We
concede that such communications are normally made by the insured
to a layman and in many cases no lawyer will actually be retained
for the purpose of defending the insured. . . . [W]e believe that
the insured may properly assume that the communication is made
to the insurer as an agent for the dominant purpose of transmitting
93

it to an attorney for the protection of the interests of the insured.
The court further stated: "We can see no logical reason for a
different result when a transcription for the first confidential
communication is transmitted with the consent of the insured to
''
the second attorney. 94

In view of this argument, it seems unjustifiable to maintain
that the identity of the agent transmitting a confidential communication on behalf of a corporate client may jeopardize that
corporate client's attorney-client "privilege."
Privilege in Federal Courts
The jurisdiction of the federal courts extends to both diversity cases and federal question cases. 95 Generally in diversity
cases the federal courts follow the state substantive law and the
federal procedural law pursuant to rule of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins. 6 Federal courts have held that state laws creating
a "privilege" are substantive, and they have followed them in diversity cases.17 Therefore, "It]here is no question but that in
diversity cases, the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins

. ..

requires

the federal courts to ascertain and follow what the state law is if
the state decisions are sufficiently conclusive, definite and final." 9
The federal courts in diversity cases must follow the state created "privilege" regardless whether that "privilege" is estab93 Id. at 460-61, 197 N.E.2d at 17.
Id. at 461, 197 N.E.2d at 18.
[5 28 U.S.C. §§1331-32 (1964).
96 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
97Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 965 (1956), overruled as to other holdings, Carter Prod., Inc. v.
Eversharp, Inc., 360 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1966). Contra, Ex parte Sparrow,
14 F.R.D. 351, (N.D. Ala. 1953). "While this court does not consider the
question of privilege to be a matter of substance and therefore controlled by
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins ..
" Id. at 353.
,) Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 627 (9th Cir. 1960) ; cf. Hill v. Huddleston, 263 F. Supp. 108, 110 (D. Md. 1967).
9
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lished by the legislature or the courts. 9 Even when "it seems
unnecessary to solve any choice of law problem" 10 0 where both
the state and federal law acknowledge- the same "privilege" the
state law determines the scope of the privilege. 10 1
At least for cases where jurisdiction is based on diversity
and where the state in which discovery is sought has established
012
a "privilege" by statute, the cases of Palmer v. Fisher'
and Ex
03
parte Sparrow have established that the law of the state
wherein discovery is sought controls, irrespective of the trial
states recognition of the "privilege." An interesting distinction
of this principle was developed in Application of Cepeda.0 4 In
that case the plaintiff in a libel suit in California sought a deposition from a magazine writer living in New York. While
New York does not afford any "privilege" to journalists, California does. Under California statute, journalists need not disclose the source of any information procured for any publication.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York
ruled on the two diversity issues involved in Cepeda. The first
question - that of whether state or federal law was to be applied - having been decided in favor of state law, the court
went on to state the second question:
[T]he case at bar presents a somewhat novel situation for the
place of trial and the place of deposition are located in different
states. More important, the place of trial, namely, California, recognizes a privilege in this area, whereas New York, the place of
deposition, does not. Thus, the second question posed is whether
the law of the deposition state, wherein there is no privilege, or
the law 05of the trial state, wherein there is a privilege, is to be
applied.
After d i s c u s s i n g both Ex parte Sparrow'01 and Palmer v.
Fisher,10 7 the court concluded:
Thus, the sum total of both cases would seem to be that where
a deposition is being taken in a state whose declared public policy
has carved out a privilege in favor of a certain class of communication, a federal court sitting in that state will apply that pronounced
public policy to questions propounded on a deposition of an out-ofErie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
v. Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925, 927 (E.D. Ky. 1962).
Fisher, 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 965 (1956), overruled as to other holdings, Carter Prod., Inc. v. Eversharp, Inc., 360 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1966); Anderson v. Benson, 117 F.
Supp. 765 (D. Neb. 1953).
102 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 965 (1956), overruled as to other holdings, Carter Prod., Inc. v. Eversharp, Inc., 360 F.2d 868
(7th Cir. 1966).
103 14 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ala. 1953).
09

100 United States
10, See Palmerv.

104 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D. N.Y. 1964).
105 Id. at 468.

100 14 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ala. 1953).
07 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U;S. 965 (1956), overruled as to other holdings, Carter Prod., Inc. v; Eversharp, Inc., 360 F.2d
868 (7th Cir. 1966).
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state suit, even though the trial state does not recognize the privilege.
When viewed in this light the cases cited supra, applying the
public policy of the deposition state recognizing a privilege, are distinguishable from the situation at bar and, in fact, support the conclusion that in the instant case, the law0 8 of the place of trial, which
recognizes the privilege, should apply.'
The special circumstances involved in Cepeda limit its applicability as a ruling on "privilege."
In general, and despite

Cepeda, the state statutory "privilege" of the state wherein discovery is sought remains the controlling statute in diversity cases.
While it would appear proper to also have the state "privilege"
apply if jurisdiction is based on a federal question, or if the state

common law establishes the "privilege," these questions have not
yet been fully resolved by the courts.
Some federal courts have held that "privilege" is to be ascertained by state law even in a federal question case. 10 9 In Baird
V. Koerner' ° the court found that state law was applicable in
determining whether an attorney could be compelled to testify
pursuant to a petition of a special agent of the United States
Internal Revenue Service seeking aid of the district court to
compel testimony of an attorney as to the identity of a person
who might be able to pay an internal revenue tax.
The court held that the state statute was applicable in determining the scope of the attorney-client "privilege":
[B]ecause the attorney is created by state law, and differs from
state to state, so the nature and extent of the privilege that exists
between attorney and client varies. We find in Corpus Juris Secundum, 35 C.J.S. Federal Courts §131 (b), the general statement: 'On
the question of privileged communications, the federal courts follow
the law of the state of the forum.'1 1

The court further stated:
In summation, we find (1) that because the relationship of
client and attorney is created and controlled by the law of the various states; and that such creation and control is recognized, followed, and approved by the federal courts, the nature and extent
of the privilege created between a lawyer and his client by the
attorney-client relationship requires the federal courts to follow
the state law; (2) that some considerable number of federal cases
enunciate the rule that the state law governs the rule of privilege;
(3) that some federal cases apply the law of the forum state, but
do so without enunciating the principle under which they act; (4)
that no federal statute forbids the use of the law of the forum state,
and that if there is any definite rule set up by federal statute, it
requires us to follow the law of the forum state, and (5) any federal
'common law' which may exist does not require us to ignore the
108 Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465, 469-70 (S.D. N.Y. 1964).
109 Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
(N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
110 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
111 Id. at 628.
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forum state law .. and we hold the law of the forum
state should,
2
and does control - here the State of California.1
But the matter is far from clear. For example, underlying
Anderson v. Benson"' there is an implication that in the absence
of a state statute establishing a "privilege" between attorney and
client, the "privilege" might not exist in federal court. In his
4
second memorandum opinion in the Radiant Burners case,"
Chief Justice Campbell casts further doubt on the point. The
defendant relying on Palmer V. Fisher 15 had contended that the
federal court should apply Illinois state law to the attorney-client
"privilege," thus extending the "privilege" to corporate clients.
Judge Campbell discounted the defendant's contention, stating
that: "In Palmer, the Court of Appeals was considering a statutory and not a common law privilege." 116 Although later reversing Judge Campbell's primary holding that the attorney-client
"privilege" cannot be invoked by a corporate client, the court of
1 17
appeals did not discuss the above language.
Good Cause
"Good cause" is expressly required under the federal rule
8
It
to obtain leave of court for the production of documents."
is equally required, under both federal and Illinois rules, for
physical and mental examinations. As a concept, "good cause"
does not lend itself to generic definition. It has been variously
described and is often confused with necessity.
"Good cause" has been defined as something more than relevancy, and as such confined to those rules by which it is expressly
required. 19 To equate it to relevancy is redundant: "The specific requirement of good cause would be meaningless if good
cause could be sufficiently established by merely showing that
the desired materials are relevant, for the relevancy standard
has already been imposed ' 120 by other rules. This view is supported by the United States Supreme Court decision in Schlagen1
hauf v. Holder."'
The Court directed the trial judge to re-examine his order requiring the defendant-driver in an automobile
112Id. at 632.
11" 117 F. Supp. 765 (D. Neb. 1953).
"14 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American
Gas Ass'n, 209 F. Supp. 321
(N.D. Ill. 1962), r'ev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
115 228 F.2d 603, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 965 (1956), overruled as to other
holdings, Carter Prod., Inc. v. Eversharp, Inc., 360 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1966).
116 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 209 F. Supp. 321, 322
(N.D. Ill. 1963), rev'd 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
117 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th
Cir. 1963).
118 FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
But see 1967 Proposed Amendments, Rule 84(a),
43 F.R.D. 211, 255-56, which eliminates the "good cause" requirement except for "work product."
119 Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962).
"20 Id. at 924.
121379 U.S. 104 (1964).
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accident case to appear for a series of physical examinations.
The Court stated:
The courts of appeals in other cases [footnote omitted] have
also recognized that Rule 34's good-cause requirement is not a mere
formality, but is a plainly expressed limitation on the use of that
Rule. . . . They are not met by mere conclusory allegations of the
pleadings - nor by mere relevance to the case - but require an
affirmative showing by the movant that each condition as to which
the examination is sought is really and genuinely in controversy and2
that good cause exists for ordering each particular examination.12
"Relevance" is a more easily satisfied test in discovery procedures than is "good cause." To compel the production of all
relevant documents could constitute an extreme harassment and/
or an unnecessary invasion of privacy. 12 3 Similarly, the invasion
of the individual's privacy by a physical or mental examination
is so serious that a strict standard of "good cause," supervised
by the district court, is manifestly appropriate. 1 4 The "good
cause" requirement is designed to protect against such abuses in
the production of documents and in the ordering of physical and
mental examinations which might otherwise be permitted under
the relevancy test. Parenthetically it might be added that the
sought-for material can ordinarily be identified, located, and revealed by deposition or interrogatory."2
"Good cause" has also been defined as something more than
relevancy "1 6 or as the equivalent of relevancy"'7 and as such applicable to all the rules of discovery, regardless of any express
language in the rules. The "good cause" requirement under this
description is treated merely as a question of the burden of proceeding.12 8 Thus, under the rules which expressly require "good
cause," the burden of obtaining leave of court to discover rests
upon the party seeking discovery. On the other hand, under the
rules which do not expressly require "good cause," the burden of
obtaining order of court to limit discovery rests upon the party
subject to discovery. The trouble with this view is that "it
interprets [the express language of the rules in regard to "good
cause"] as redundant and thereby violates elementary canons of
construction."129
122 Id. at 118.

122 Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962).
124 Cf. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941); Schlagenhauf v.
Holder, 321 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 379 U.S. 104,
118 (1964). But see W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §822 (Rules ed. 1961).
"25 Cf. People ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Bua, 37 Ill.2d 180, 226
N.E.2d 6 (1967).
126 United Air Lines Inc. v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213 (D. Del. 1960).
127 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 17 F.R.D. 273 (S.D. N.Y.

1955).
F.

126 United Air Lines Inc. v.
JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE

United States, 26 F.R.D. 213 (D. Del. 1960)
§6.10 (1965).
29 Crowe v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 29 F.R.D. 148, 150 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
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Work Porduct
The "work product" exemption afforded to otherwise discoverable material was created in Hickman v. Taylor.130 It is still
applied by federal courts without any significant change. In
Illinois, however, its scope was recently narrowed in Monier v.
Chamberlain.131 Hickman v. Taylor8 2 involves a suit brought
under the Jones Act concerning a maritime accident. The representative of the heirs of a crew member killed in that accident
sought to discover statements (taken by defendant's attorney)
of surviving crew members shortly after the accident. The
United States Supreme Court did not consider the material to
involve confidential communication between client and attorney,
and hence did not find it privileged on that ground. 133 However,
the Court held the statements to be exempt from discovery inasmuch as they constituted the "work product of a lawyer."
Taken together, the Hickman case and the rules' 3 4 pertinent
to discovery outline the requirements for application of the
"work product" exemption. First, the sought-for material must
be relevantli5; an adverse finding at this point precludes discovery. And, if discovery involves the production of documents
or the inspection of copies or photographs,136 or if it seeks, the
mental/physical examination of persons," 7 then the "good cause"
requirement must additionally be met.1 81 Providing the material
fulfills these requirements and is otherwise not privileged, it may
then be examined to determine its "work product" status. If
the material sought has been "collected by an adverse party's
counsel in the course of preparation for possible litigation" 13 9
then it is "work product" and as such is entitled to a qualified
exemption. In some cases, if "necessity" is shown for securing
130

329 U.S. 495 (1947).

Actually the term "work product" was first

used in the appellate decision of this same case, 153 F.2d 212, 223 (3d Cir.
1945). 1967 Proposed Amendments, Rule 26(b)(3), 43 F.R.D. 211, 225, only
requires showing of "good cause" for "work product."
131 35 Il1.2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
132 329 U.S. 495 (1947).

133 Id. at 506, 508.
134 FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
1 8

FED.

R. Civ. P. 26 (b).

"Petitioner has made more than an ordinary

request for relevant, non-privileged facts...

"

Hickman v. Taylor, 329

U.S. 495, 508 (1947).
136 "Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor ... the
court in which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing .

. .

of .

.

. documents

R. Civ. P. 34.
137 "[T]he court in which the action is pending may order . . . [the
party] to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician.
The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown ..
FED.
D"
R. Civ. P. 35(a).
138 The court in Hickman did not discuss satisfying the requirement of
"good cause" as the "petitioner was proceeding primarily under Rule 33."
329 U.S. at 504.
139 Id. at 505. "Work product" does not mean "that all written materials obtained or prepared by an adversary's counsel with an eye toward
litigation are necessarily free from discovery in all cases." Id. at 511.
.

FED.
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the "work product," discovery may still be obtained.

But in

Hickman the court has established an absolute exemption for all
such "work product" that would reveal the opinions or mental
14 0
impressions of adversary's counsel.
The former rule in Illinois defined "work product" as "memoranda, reports of documents made by or for a party in prepara-

tion for trial.'

11

While essentially the definition obtaining in

Hickman, the Illinois rule made somewhat broader provision for

absolute exemption. 12 It had exempted from discovery all material falling within the "work product" definition, except that
which was independently admissible at trial as evidence.' However, the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Monier V.
Chamberlain1 4 declared a new rule, one which is narrower than
either the former state rule or the current federal rule.
In Monier v. Chamberlain,"5 the court permitted discovery
of material which defendant had contended to be the "work prod-

uct" of his attorney.

The court found that:

Only those memoranda, reports or documents which reflect the employment of the attorney's legal expertise, those 'which reveal the
shaping process by which the attorney has arranged the available
evidence for use in trial as dictated by his training and experience'
[citation omitted] may properly be said to be 'made in preparation
for trial' . . . [and thus qualify as a "work product" exemption] .46

The court attempted to clarify the delineation between what is
140
Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble
information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the historical and the necessary
way in which lawyers act within the framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients' interests. This
work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, memoranda,
correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and count-

less other tangible and intangible ways. .

.

. Were such materials open

to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in
writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the
preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would
be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice
would be poorly served.
We do not mean to say that all written materials obtained or prepared by an adversary's counsel with an eye toward litigation are
necessarily free from discovery in all cases.
Id. at 511. 1967 Proposed Amendments, Rule 26(b)(3), 43 F.R.D. 211, 225
would seem to eliminate the absolute exemption.
141 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §101.19-5 (1965).
142Eizerman v. Behn, 9 Ill. App. 2d 263, 282, 132 N.E.2d 267, 788, 797
(1956).
143 Stimpert v. Abdnour, 24 Ill.2d 26, 179 N.E.2d 602 (1962).
144 35 Ill.2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
"Material prepared by or for
a party in preparation for trial is subject to discovery only if it does not
contain or disclose. the theories, mental impressions, or litigation plans of
the party's attorney." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201(b) (2) (1967). For
the chronology between the supreme court decision in Monier and the final
drafting of Rule 201 (b) (2) see Tone, Comments on the New Illinois Supreme
Court Rules, XLVIII CH. BAR REC. 46, 49 (1967).
14535 Ill. 2d 351, 221 N.E. 2d 410 (1966).
146 Id. at 359-60, 221 N.E.2d at 416.
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and what is not "work product" by citing examples:
Thus, memoranda made by counsel of his impression of a prospective witness, as distinguished from verbatim statements of such
witness, trial briefs, documents revealing a particular marshalling
of the evidentiary facts for presentment at the trial, and similar
documents which reveal the attorney's 'mental processes' in shaping his theory of his client's cause, are documents 'made in preparation for trial' and exempt from discovery ...

[as 'work product'].

Other material, not disclosing such conceptual data but containing
relevant and material evidentiary details must, under our discovery
14
rules, remain subject to the truth-seeking processes thereof.
In effect, however, the court in Monier re-established the principle that "work product" should be absolutely exempt from discovery, whether or not "necessity" exists:
We have considered the propriety of requiring under the Illinois discovery practice, as under Federal Rule 34 [citation omitted],
that 'good cause' be shown before otherwise properly discoverable
material, or material ordinarily protected from discovery under a
broader 'work product' doctrine than the one adopted here, need be
disclosed. We have concluded that the attendant problems which
arise under the 'good cause' doctrine render adoption of that theory
undesirable ...
. .. We believe that narrowing the scope of the 'work product'
doctrine - and rendering material encompassed thereby absolutely
exempt from discovery, while at the same time freeing relevant
and material
evidentiary matter - is preferable to the Federal
148
position.
As with privileged communications "work product" may involve the use of agents. The extent to which the "work product"
exemption may be claimed when the agent is not an attorney is
an issue of considerable controversy and disagreement219 Some
147 Id. at 360, 221 N.E.2d at 416.
148 Id. at 360-61, 221 N.E. 2d at 417. The court in arriving at its deci-

sion seemingly confused "good cause" with "necessity."
149 C. J. Lumbard, dissenting in American Express Warehousing Ltd. v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1967) stated:
Some district judges in this circuit have held, as Judge Ryan did,
that the work-product doctrine protects only the work normally performed by an attorney as distinct from that usually done by an investigator. See Burke v. United States, 32 F.R.D. 213 (E.D.N.Y. 1963)
(Bartels, D.J.); Brown v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 17 F.R.D. 324
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (Dawson, D.J.); Szymanski v. New York, N.H. &
H.R.R., 14 F.R.D. 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (Sugarman, D.J.); Bifferato v.
States Marine Corp., 11 F.R.D. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (Weinfeld, D.J.).
Other judges have held that the doctrine extends to investigation performed by nonlawyers under the direction of attorneys. See Snyder v.
United States, 20 F.R.D. 7 (E.D.N.Y. 1956) (Bruchhausen, D.J.);
Slifka Fabrics v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 19 F.R.D. 374 (S.D.
N.Y. 1956) (Levet, D.J.). The conflict of decisions in the district courts
of this circuit is paralleled by a similar conflict among courts of appeals, compare, e.g., Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967, 70 S. Ct. 999, 94 L.Ed. 1375 (1950),
holding that statements obtained by nonlawyers for the use of
attorneys are work-product, with, e.g., United States v. McKay, 372
F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967), and among commentators. Compare, e.g.,
Wright, Discovery, 35 F.R.D. 39, 50-51 (1964), with, e.g., Developments
in the Law Id. at 285.

Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 1031 (1961).
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authorities maintain that "statements of nonexpert witnesses,
taken by a claim agent or investigator under ordinary circumstances, with a view to assessing and possibly resisting a claim
.. are to be treated as work product"'150 that "where the lawyer

has supplied the formula for taking the statement or the pattern
of questions to be asked [by a layman] and this has significantly
shaped the statement, it may well be treated as work product""'

and that "[r]eports and statements of experts are likely to be
treated as work product,"' 152 to a greater extent in the federal
rules than in the Illinois rules." 3 Assuming that such material
may constitute "work product" and so be exempt from discovery,

the exemption may be forfeited, even in the absence of "necessity," by the conduct of the party claiming the exemption. Examples of such conduct are counsel's use of a statement to refresh a witness's recollection 5 or by submitting an expert's
report. 55
Necessity/Good Cause

Much confusion appears to exist within the judiciary concerning the application of the concepts of "good cause" and "necessity" to the law of discovery. As established in Hickman v.
Taylor"06 "necessity" is required to justify the discovery of material otherwise protected by the "work product" exemption.
"Good cause" is required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

for the discovery and the production of documents and things
for inspection, copying, or photographing, 1 ' and for obtaining
by means of discovery the physical and mental examination of
150 F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE §6.9, at 208 (1965).
151 Id. at 207.
152 1d. at 208.

153 The standard order of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,
used in motions to produce - commonly referred to as the "Monier order"
- excludes experts from discovery who are merely consultants in preparation of the case and will not testify at trial. This exclusion is compatible
with the narrow definition of "work product" since such experts are privy
to the attorney's thoughts and tactics in the case.
15' See Justice v. Pennsylvania R.R., 41 Ill. App. 2d 352, 191 N.E.2d
72 (1963).
155
Normally, an expert witness not an employee of the party is
not subject to examination by an opposing party by way of deposition
unless the circumstances indicate a need for it ...
When a party offers the affidavit of an expert witness in opposition to, or in support of, a motion for summary judgment, it waives its
right not to have the deposition of said expert taken. The testimony of
the expert, for all practical purposes, has already been offered in the
case, and the taking of his deposition by the party against whom the
affidavit was used is nothing more than cross-examination.
Cox v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 31 F.R.D. 583, 584 (S.D. Tex. 1962).
166 329 U.S. 495 (1947).

157 FED. R. CIv. P. 34. The requirement to proceed upon motion showing
good cause is eliminated in 1967 Proposed Amendments, Rule 34 (a), 43
F.R.D. 211, 255.
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persons. 1581 It has been 15 9 and still is required under the Illinois

Supreme Court rules for obtaining the physical and mental examination of parties and other persons6 00 In a laudable attempt
to avoid the problems inherent in the application of the doctrine
of "necessity," the Illinois Supreme Court stated in Monier V.
Chamberlain:161
We have considered the propriety of requiring under the Illinois discovery practice . . . that 'good cause' be shown before other-

wise properly discoverable material or material ordinarily protected
from discovery under a broader 'work product' doctrine than the
one adopted here, need be disclosed. We have concluded that the
attendant problems which arise under the 'good
cause' doctrine ren2
der adoption of that theory undesirable.1

The "broader work product doctrine" referred to in Monier
is undoubtedly the rule established in Hickman.1 0 3 However, in
Hickman the United States Supreme Court discussed "necessity"
rather than "good cause." The use of the term "good cause" instead of "necessity" in Monier illustrates the treatment of these
concepts in the federal cases. In Commonwealth Edison Company v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company,' a civil antitrust suit in which the defendant claimed the "work product"
exemption for certain documents which the plaintiff sought to discover, the court stated: "For plaintiffs to overcome this prima
facie showing that these documents are entitled to protection
from discovery based on "work product," they must first convince the court that these documents are essential to the preparation of their case.'

165

The court cited Hickman V. Taylor'6

as controlling. It then went on to discuss various situations in
which necessity could overcome the "work product" exemption.
However, all of this discussion (and the opinions of the cited
authorities) used the term "good cause" and not "necessity."
After enumerating and discussing, in terms of "good cause," the
special circumstances - e.g., non-availability of witnesses, exclusive or superior opportunity for knowledge, on-the-spot statements, and change in circumstances - which might create "necessity," the court stated in summation:
After a showing of. good cause, as outlined above, in camera
inspection of these documents by the court would be appropriate.
[Citation omitted] The respective motions of defendants for orders
of protection for the work product of counsel are hereby granted
without prejudice to plaintiffs' right to move for and obtain the
158

FED. R.

Civ. P. 35(a).

1" ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §101.17-1 (1965).
'Go ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, §215(a) (1967).

161 35 Ill.2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
162 Id. at 360, 221 N.E.2d at 417.
163 329 U.S. 495 (1947).

164211 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
165 Id. at 740.
166 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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production of all or part of such documents upon a showing of good
cause and relevancy under the standards heretofore outlined in this
memorandum, and upon a showing that such
documents are not en16 7
titled to any other protection or privilege.

Other district courts have equated "good cause" and "ne' 16 8
Yet other courts have distinguished to some extent
between "necessity" and "good cause" by holding that "necessity" is something more than ordinary "good cause," although
it is of the same nature. A nebulous distinction of this type was
made in the case of E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 16 9 in which the court stated:

cessity.

Broadly speaking, the [work product exemption] rule is nothing more than an extension of the requirement for a showing of
good cause for the production of documents to information of all
kinds developed by a lawyer in preparing his case for trial, with
the addition (binding upon this Court under the Alltmont decision,
supra) that in such cases the courts are, in effect, put to the very
difficult task of finding very good cause as distinguished from good
cause.70

Finally, there are those cases that discuss allowing discovery of "work product" solely in terms of "necessity." In Gulf
Construction Company v. St. Joe Paper Company' 71 the court

held that there was a sufficient showing of "necessity" for the
defendant to discover correspondence in the possession of plaintiff's attorney between the plaintiff and a third party, on the
grounds that nothing other than this correspondence could properly reveal the facts and the defendant could not obtain production of the correspondence from the third party. The circumstance that certain facts could only be made available to the
plaintiff by discovery of "work product" of the defendant's attorney was held to constitute "necessity" in Stone v. Grayson
172
Shops.
Perhaps the best example of the application of the concept of
167 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 211 F. Supp.
736, 743 (N.D. Ill. 1962) (emphasis added).
168 In the case of O'Donnell v. Breuninger, 9 F.R.D. 245 (D.D.C. 1949),
a suit for alienation of affections, in which the defendant, upon taking the
deposition of the plaintiff husband, sought to discover the results of the
plaintiff's attorney's investigation concerning the registration of the plaintiff's wife and the defendant in the same hotel. The court concluded: "Even
if the information sought could be considered part of the so-called 'work
product of the lawyer,' necessity is shown for requiring plaintiff to respond
to the question put." Id. at 248. Earlier, the court, in discussing the
qualified nature of the "work product" exemption, stated:
[W]here a party makes more than an ordinary request for relevant,
non-privileged facts in the possession of his adversaries or their counsel,
he must make a proper showing of good cause, that is, of the necessity
for production of the material or that denial of production will cause
hardship or injustice.
Id. at 247 (emphasis added).
169 24 F.R.D. 416 (D. Del. 1959).
170 Id. at 420.
171 24 F.R.D. 411 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
1728

F.R.D. 101 (S.D.N.Y.

1948).
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"necessity" is found in Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 113 wherein
the court's opinion deals with both "good cause" and "necessity."
The court allowed the plaintiff to discover the facts contained in
a report of the defendant's heating expert. The report concerned
his examination of a propane stove which in exploding had killed
plaintiff's decedents. The court dismissed the defendant's claim
to the "work product" exemption, stating:
[T]he equipment was not only disconnected during the course of
the inspection .. .certain important parts were removed by ...
Union Carbide [the defendant] to their shop before being returned.
Under such circumstances, the best evidence of the condition in
which this equipment was, right after the explosion, are the notes
made of such condition by the expert, Peacock, presumably incorporated in his report, now the subject of the motion. This report
would certainly be more reliable than the recollection, some two
years later, of these plumbers, who worked in conjunction with the

defendants, and without memoranda to refresh their recollection.

Thus the 'necessity or justification' [citation omitted] exists,
to obtain discovery of the otherwise protected 'work product' of the

lawyer. Moreover, these very facts constitute the 'good cause' requisite for the issuance of the order of inspection and copying under
F.R.C.P. 34.174
"Good cause" (as such and not as "necessity") has been defined as "such circumstances as give the court reason to expect
that the beneficial objections of pre-trial discovery will be
achieved." ' 175 Perhaps a comparable definition of "necessity"
might be: such circumstances, existing at the time when discovery is sought, as give the court reason to believe that a capable attorney could not, by reasonable diligence, obtain the
same factual information which his adversary has already obtained.
Experts' Reports
The discovery of experts' reports, although involved in many
cases in the federal courts, has only been an issue in three reported decisions in Illinois.176 In essence, the Illinois courts have
held that, on the basis of the "work product" or "material in
preparation for trial" exemption, experts' reports are not subject to discovery. In view of the recent narrowing of the scope
of the "work product" exemption in Illinois, 177 experts' reports
may also lose their immunity to discovery.
Yowell v. Hunter,17 8 the first Illinois case dealing with the
'7315 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954).

17 Id. at 378.
175 Crowe v. Chespeake & 0. Ry., 29 F.R.D. 148, 151 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
178 See Yowell v. Hunter, 403 Ill. 202, 85 N.E.2d 674 (1949); City of
Chicago v. Harrison Halsted Bldg. Corp., 11 Il1.2d 431, 143 N.E.2d 40
(1957); Kemeny v. Skorch, 22 Ill. App.2d 160, 159 N.E.2d 489 (1959).
'77 See Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill.2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
178

403 Ill.
202, 85 N.E.2d 674 (1949).
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discovery of material prepared by an expert, involved a will contest the basic issue of which was whether the testator's signature
had been forged. The court was there concerned with allowing
pre-trial discovery of photographs taken by a handwriting expert
of documents signed by the testator. The Illinois Supreme Court
held that the photographs were exempt from discovery, since
they "were actually prepared in preparation for trial and as
such were not subject to production under Rule 17."'1 9 "Rule
17" referred to the Supreme Court Rule then in force concerning the discovery of documents and books, which provided the
following exemption: "This Rule shall not apply to memoranda,
reports, or documents prepared by or for either party in preparation for trial, or to any communication between any party or
his agent and the attorney for such party." 180 That is, in order
to exempt the photographs from discovery the court had only to
find that they were made by or for a party in preparation for
the trial. This the court found to be the case, stating: "The
question might occur as to what is or is not preparation for trial
but as we view the photographs prepared by the experts in this
case it is aparent that all of them were made in preparation for
trial."181
The second case, that of City of Chicago v. Harrison-Halsted
Building Corporation,s2was a condemnation proceeding in which
the defendant sought to discover by interrogatories the amount
and basis of the plaintiff's offer to purchase the property made
prior to instituting the suit. After stating that discovery could
not be precluded simply because plaintiff's offer was in the nature
of an attempt to compromise and, hence, inadmissible at trial,
the court held that the material was nevertheless not subject to
discovery:
[T]he defendant was not entitled to the information sought by the
discovery proceedings. The undisputed evidence is that the appraisals were made by the two witnesses as experts in the real
estate field at the request of counsel for plaintiff for his use in the
trial. This being true, the evidence was privileged and need not be
1 3
disclosed either at time discovery is sought or at the trial. 1

Although the reasoning and the terminology employed by
the court is somewhat confusing, the only basis on which the
material sought in this case could have been protected from discovery was the former Illinois Supreme Court rule precluding
the discovery disclosure of memoranda, reports or documents
made by or for a party in preparation for trial.114
179

Id. at 210, 85 N.E.2d at 679.

'80 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §259.17(1)

(1947).

Yowell v. Hunter, 403 Ill. 202, 210, 85 N.E.2d 674, 679 (1949).
182 11 Ill.2d 431, 143 N.E.2d 40 (1957).
183 Id. at 436, 143 N.E.2d at 43-44.
184 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §101.19-5(1)
(1965).
181
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The latest case dealing with the discovery of an expert's
report was Kemeny v. Skorch,185 in which the defendant sought
to discover the report of a medical expert who had examined the
plaintiff and who might be called to testify at trial. The court
held that while the report was not protected by the attorneyclient privilege, it was exempt from discovery as material made
for or by a party in preparation for trial.1Y 6 But the court clearly
stated that it so held only because it was bound to, and proceeded
emphatically to berate the rule which had required such a result.
The language raises the strong possibility that if the supreme
court rule directed to the Illinois version of the "work product"
exemption should ever be narrowed, the court would certainly
take advantage of that narrowing to allow discovery of experts'
18 7
reports.
While the narrowing of the "work product" exemption asked
for by the court in Kemeny may appear to have been provided
by Monier and the new Illinois Supreme Court Rules, a closer
analysis raises the question of whether the court in Kemeny could
have allowed the discovery of all experts' reports, even on the
basis of the new Illinois "work product" exemption. Certainly
it could be argued that the photographs taken by the handwriting expert in the Yowell case would indicate which of the available documents were thought to be the most favorable evidence
for presentation at trial. Hence they could be seen as "documents revealing a particular marshalling of the evidentiary facts
for presentment at the trial, and [/or] . . . documents which
reveal the attorney's 'mental processes' in shaping his theory of
his client's cause,"' 88 both of which categories are exempt from
discovery. The same argument could be made concerning the
particular factors which might have influenced the real estate
experts' offer in the Harrison-Halstedcase, or concerning the
18522
186

Ill. App. 2d 160, 159 N.E.2d 489 (1959).

In the instant case, while the report is not privileged, it was certainly a report made by or for a party in preparation for trial and hence

not available on discovery proceedings. The language of the rule is clear
and cannot be evaded by a cogent argument against its usefulness. We
must therefore hold that the document is not available to defendants on
pre-trial proceedings. It may become relevant upon trial and if so, it
would not be exempt as a privileged document.
Id. at 169, 159 N.E.2d at 493.
187
We say all this to put in its true perspective the role of this
particular type of witness. He is part of the trial apparatus of a personal injury case. As such, every possible step should be taken to channel his contributions in a direction that will serve the ends of justice.
One such step is to make his reports as non-partisan, objective and
scientific as are the other notable activities of his profession. To that

end, we believe that the rule should be revised, but while it stands we
have no choice but to interpret it fairly.
Id. at 171, 159 N.E.2d at 494.
188

(1966).

Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill.2d 351, 360, 221 N.E.2d 410, 416
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importance of particular medical aspects of the examination in
the Kemeny case.189
Thus, the first impression gained upon combining Monier
with the dicta in Kemeny is that in Illinois experts' reports may
no longer be protected from discovery. But the situation is not

clear-cut. If the discovery is sought for the purpose of ascertaining the other party's contemplated use of an expert, or the
identity of the expert to be used, it ought certainly to fall within
the "work product" exemption even under the narrow scope afforded that exemption in Illinois, since such discovery would
clearly "disclose the theories, mental impressions, or litigation
plans of the party's attorney."1 0 At the moment neither conclusion can be reached with any great degree of certainty, pending appeal and review.
While the number of decisions in Illinois concerned with
the discovery of experts' reports are few, the issue has been
tested frequently in federal courts. But as yet there has been
no consistency in either the decisions or the rationales underlying them."o1 Illustrative of the divergent views of the federal
courts in deciding this question are the cases resulting from a
patent infringement suit brought in the District Court in Tennessee, in which the defendant sought to discover the reports of
two expert witnesses. The plaintiff, Cold Metal Process Co., had
employed Dr. Buerger, a professor of metallurgy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as an expert to determine if metal
products made by their competitors infringed their patent. Dr.
189 For an analogous situation of identifying expert witnesses who will
be called at trial, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §58(3) (1967) and note 66
supra. But see note 153 supra. It is interesting to note the changes proposed for both the federal and Illinois rules (set out below) immediately
subsequent to the respective supreme court cases modifying the work product exemption which would have excluded the conclusions of an expert obtained in preparation for trial from discovery.
"The court shall not order the production or inspection of any part of
the writing that reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories, or except as provided in Rule 35, the conclusions of an
expert." ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
COURTS OF TIlE UNITED

TO

RULES OF

CIVIL

PROCEDURE

FOR THE

DISTRICT

STATES (1946), 5 F.R.D. 433, 457 (1946).
Notwithstanding the foregoing exceptions, the opinion of an expert obtained in preparation for litigation, or its existence, location, or
custody is not discoverable. However, if the opinion is based upon facts
learned through an investigation, those facts may be discoverable under
the conditions set forth in clause (ii) of this subparagraph (d).
1963 Proposed Illinois Supreme Court Rules, Rule 1(2)(d), reported in Rall,
Proposed Rules on Civil Discovery, 53 ILL. BAR J. 572, 573 (1965).
190 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201(b) (2) (1967). But see City of Chicago v. Albert J. Schorsch Realty Co., 95 Ill. App. 264, 279, 238 N.E.2d 426,
433 (1968).
191 1967 Proposed Amendments, Rule 26(b) (4), 43 F.R.D. 211, 225-26,
attempts to establish a consistent standard by providing for discovery of
experts' facts and opinions upon a showing of "necessity" or, in the alternative, discovery of the identity of experts who are to testify at trial and
facts and opinions relevant to the testimony.
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Buerger terminated his employment with the plaintiff prior to
the completion of his work. Dr. Sachs, a professor at Case
Institute of Technology, whose background was similar to that
of Dr. Buerger, took over the investigation. Defendant subsequently sought discovery from both Dr. Buerger' 9 2 and Dr.
Sachs. 193 Objections were raised to questions on both depositions directed to the conclusions reached in the reports. Essentially, there was no difference between the two experts as to the
relationship to either of the parties or to the facts involved in
their study. The only variable was that of point of time when
each was in the employ of the plaintiff. This difference did not
merit consideration by either of the courts, and can be assumed
not to have been pertinent to the availability of facts for either
expert, in view of the nature of their investigations. But on the
one hand the District Court in Massachusetts (the forum of the
deposition where a ruling was sought) held that discovery could
not be obtained from Dr. Buerger, because in his role as an expert in the employ of the plaintiff he was an agent in a confidential attorney-client communication ;194 while on the other hand
the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio (the forum
of the deposition where a ruling was sought) held that Dr. Sachs
was compelled to answer the questions posed during the discovery deposition. 9 5 Upon appeal, the Sachs decision was upheld
as to both result and reasoning.- 6 The court of appeals stated:
Dr. Sachs is not an attorney but is an expert in X-ray metallegraphy, who was engaged by counsel for the Cold Metal Process
Company to make certain tests and X-ray photographs of samples
of metal furnished him. His services were procured in preparation
for the trial of a patent case. The information obtained by Dr.
Sachs is not deemed to fall within the attorney-client privilege protecting the 'work product of the lawyer' this information appears
to be essential to a vital issue in the case and is evidentiary in
character.
We think, therefore, that as correctly reasoned by the district
judge, Hickman v. Taylor [citation omitted] does not sustain the
position of appellant that the witness, Sachs, was privileged to decline to divulge the requested information by refusing to answer
the questions put to him. 197
The reasoning is neither extensive nor particularly enlightening
in these two cases. Taken together, they do indicate the current
divergence of view in the federal courts regarding the discovery
192 Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 684
(D. Mass. 1947).
19 Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425
(N.D. Ohio 1947).

194 Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 684

(D. Mass. 1947).

195 Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425

(N.D. Ohio 1947).
196

Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948).

197

Id.
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of experts' reports. A noted commentator has attempted to reconcile these divergent findings:
The Court should not ordinarily permit one party to examine an
expert engaged by the adverse party, or to inspect reports prepared
by such expert, in the absence of a showing that the facts or information sought are necessary for the moving party's preparation for trial and cannot be obtained by the moving party's independent investigation or research. 19
This statement, in effect, gives to an expert's report a qualified
exemption similar to that afforded the "work product" of the
lawyer. That is, the expert's report would be subject to discovery upon a showing of "necessity." The rationale for allowing
discovery appears to be based on a combination of "good cause"
and "necessity."' 199
The federal courts have considered various grounds for exempting the expert's report from discovery; namely, the attorneyclient privilege, 20 0 the "work product" exemption, 20 1 and a concept of fairness or the existence of a property right in the party
employing the expert in the expert's report. 20 2 It is clear that in
general an expert cannot claim the attorney-client privilege as
either the attorney or the client, a possible exception, however,
might be found in a case such as in which the doctor-defendant
(or the employee of a corporate defendant) may intend to give
expert testimony in his (or its) own behalf. 20 3 Thus, if an expert's report is to be protected from discovery by virtue of the
attorney-client privilege, it must be so protected on the basis
that the expert is an agent of the client for the purpose of making a confidential communication to the attorney.20 4 The expert's
report would not be protected by the attorney-client privilege if
the expert is held to be an agent of the attorney (that is, if the
expert falls within that class of agents of the attorney who, by
their presence during the confidential communication from the
client to the attorney, do not negate the confidential nature of
that communication). That the attorney-client privilege would
not protect the expert's report if the expert were an agent of
the attorney rather than of the client is fairly well settled by
0 5
Hickman v. Taylor,1
which establishes that the attorney-client
privilege does not protect material gathered in preparation for
trial by the attorney or, implicitly, by the attorney through his
19' 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
199 See text at note 173 supra.

§26.24, at 1531 (2d Ed. 1966).

200 See, e.g., Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7
F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947).
201 See, e.g., Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954).
202 See, e.g., Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21
(W.D. Pa. 1940).
203 Cf. Day v. Illinois Power Co., 50 Ill. App. 2d 52, 199 N.E.2d 802
(1964).
204 People v. Ryan, 30 Ill. 2d 456, 197 N.E. 2d 15 (1964).
205 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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agents. This type of relationship would not, however, preclude
a valid claim of "work product," since there is "no logical basis
for making any distinction between statements of witnesses secured by a party's trial counsel personally in preparation for
trial and those obtained by others for the use of the party's trial
20
counsel. o
Although no cases have been decided, as yet, on this basis,
it would seem that the expert's report would be protected if the
expert were the member of a profession, such as accounting,
which is in itself entitled to a privilege by state statute, for example, the court so ruled as regards the accountant in Dipson
Theatres v. Buffalo Theatres.20 7 This would not be the case in
Illinois, inasmuch as the client could not claim the accountant's
privilege. 20 8 But, in instances where the client can claim a privilege afforded to a confidential communication between himself
and a member of a profession, there is no reason why the chain
of privileges should not remain intact if the client then confidentially communicates the material to his attorney. The courts
have attempted to distinguish the expert's finding of fact on the
one hand and his conclusions on the other in allowing or disallowing discovery.2 0 9 The basis for this distinction must be
founded upon "necessity" and "work product," although the
courts do not always discuss the issue in these terms. It can
easily be seen that if the expert's report is to be treated as "work
product," then "necessity" might exist for allowing discovery
of the expert's findings of fact. Where the facts are not practically available to the adversary (either because they are in the
sole control of the other party and hence not available,2 10 or, although theoretically available, they have been materially changed
by a lapse in time211), "necessity" would exist. "Necessity"
could hardly be said to exist in-so-far as discovering the conclusions contained in the expert's report is concerned, except perhaps in an instance where the expert is the only one available in
the field or if he so outranks all other experts in a particular
field that he can be said, for all practical purposes, to be the only
expert.
The protection of the expert's report on the basis of fairness, or on the basis that the party employing the expert has a
property right in the expert's report (as was held in Lewis v.
Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1950).
F.R.D. 313 (W.D.N.Y. 1948).
208 See case cited & text in note 82 supra.
209 See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213
(D. Del. 1960).
206

2078

210 Bergstrom Paper Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 7 F.R.D. 548 (E.D.
Wis. 1947).
211 Cox v. Pennsylvania R.R., 9 F.R.D. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
Cf. Day

v. Illinois Power Co., 50 Ill.
App. 2d 52, 199 N.E. 2d 802 (1964).
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2 12
United Airlines Transport Corporation
), has not been widely
accepted although it has been discussed in many cases as an
ancillary consideration. The concept of fairness should not protect the expert's report, or at least not the factual findings contained therein, if "necessity" does in fact exist and is coupled
with an offer by the adversary of just compensation. Indeed,
just compensation by and of itself ought logically to defeat al21 3
together the property right concept.

DISCOVERY DEVICES

In order to effect the purposes of discovery, the Illinois and
federal rules provide devices for obtaining and recording facts
prior to trial. The basic devices2 14 are deposition on oral examination,215 interrogatories, 216 and production of documents and

other tangible things, including persons for physical or mental
examination.21 7 In addition, the rules provide for imposition of
sanctions for failure to comply with rules and orders of court
21s
relating to discovery.
Depositions

Upon reasonable notice a party may take the deposition of
any competent person on oral examination in a manner as would
exist at trial, in order that the facts obtained and recorded may
be subsequently used at trial.2 19 Although there is great similarity between the Illinois and federal rules pertaining to deposition, 220 the Illinois rules, unlike the federal rules, differentiate
212 32 F. Supp.
213 See text at

21 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
& authorities cited note 61 supra.
214 In addition to the basic devices, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §216 (1967)
and FED. R. Civ. P. 36 provide for admission of fact and genuineness of
documents. This device is designed to expedite proof at trial and is similar
to the interrogatories of the bills of discovery in that written demand is
made upon the adversary to admit evidentiary facts. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110A, §218 (1967) and FED. R. Civ. P. 16 provide for pretrial conferences in
which the parties, under judicial supervision, define and formulate the issues
and limit the proof to be presented, usually entering into a stipulation of uncontested matters, number of witnesses, etc.
215 See text at notes 219-78 infra.
216 See text at notes 279-340 infra.
217 See text at notes 341-456 infra.
218 See text at notes 457-89 infra.
219 ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 110A, §202 (1967) ; FaD. R. Civ. P. 26. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110A, §210 (1967) and FED. R. Civ. P. 31 also provide for deposition on written interrogatories in which the party desiring the deposition
serves questions, which constitute direct examination, on the adverse parties,
who in turn serve questions which constitute cross examination, etc. These
questions are then put to deponent orally by the official who records the
answers verbatim.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §217 (1967)

and FED. R. Civ.

P. 27 provide for perpetuating testimony prior to commencement of an action or pending appeal. The party who wishes to perpetuate testimony petitions the court after notice is given to prospective adversaries. If the petition is granted, then the examination is taken and recorded for possible
future use. See Suffolk v. Chapman, 31 Ill.2d 551, 202 N.E.2d 535 (1964)
Martin v . Reynolds Metals Corp., 297 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1961).
220 Coutrakon v. Distenfield, 21 Ill. App. 2d 146, 157 N.E.2d 555 (1959).
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discovery depositions from evidence depositions. 22 , The reasoning behind the differentiation is that if parties know a deposition
is for discovery purposes and is thus limited in use at trial, examination will be facilitated and objections to the questions
22 2
drastically reduced.
The differentiation between discovery depositions and evidence depositions under the state rules effects the manner in
which the examination is taken and the use to which it may be
put at trial. Since its purpose is mainly investigatory, the range
of questioning in a discovery deposition is broader and the rules
of evidence more relaxed than is the case for an evidence deposition. A discovery deposition, however, may be used at trial
for admission, for impeachment by prior inconsistent statements,
for any exception to the hearsay rule, or for any purpose for
22 3
which an affidavit might be used.
An evidence deposition may be used for all the purposes for
which a discovery deposition may be used; it may additionally
be used to introduce the testimony of an otherwise unavailable
witness. 224 The category "unavailable witnesses" includes persons who have died or who are out of the county and whose absence was not procured by the party offering the deposition, or
who are unable to attend or testify due to age, sickness, infirmity
or imprisonment, or whose attendance cannot be procured by
221
222

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §202 (1967).
Fitzpatrick & Goff, Discovery and Depositions, 50 NW.U.L. REV. 628

(1955).
223 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §212(a)
(1967). Allen v. Meyer, 14 11.
2d 284, 152 N.E.2d 576 (1958) ; Oberkircher v. Chicago Transit Authority,
41 Ill. App. 2d 68, 190 N.E.2d 170 (1963); Haskell v. Siegmund, 28 Ill.
App. 2d 1, 170 N.E.2d 393 (1960) ; Bessette v. Loevy, 11 Il. App. 2d 482,
138 N.E.2d 56 (1956):
Defendant upon the trial sought to impeach the witness, Yvonne
McAvoy, after she testified that she developed double vision and had
referred to it in her discovery deposition. A discovery deposition was
taken of this plaintiff, and defendant sought to show by this deposition
that she made no mention whatever of double vision when asked conconcerning her complaints of injury or ill-being. Defendant called the
court reporter to the witness stand and asked the witness to read from
her shorthand notes all the questions and answers appearing in the discovery deposition. She testified that she correctly transcribed her shorthand notes as to all questions and answers in the discovery deposition.
The deposition was offered in evidence for the purpose of impeachment,
which the court, upon objection, refused to admit. It appears there were
many matters in the discovery deposition which would have no relation
to the point of impeachment.

[I]t would have been error to allow the reporter to read to the jury the
entire deposition or to receive the deposition in evidence, which contained
matters having no bearing upon the subject of impeachment.
Id. at 488-89, 138 N.E.2d at 60.
224 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §212(b) (1967). See Redding v. Schroeder,
54 Ill. App. 2d 306, 203 N.E.2d 616 (1964) ; Cooper v. Cox, 31 Ill. App. 2d
51, 175 N.E.2d 651 (1961).
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subpoena by the party offering the deposition. 225 226The unavailability of a witness is determined at time of trial.
The federal rule provides for a single deposition.22 7 It does
not differentiate between a discovery deposition and an evidence
deposition. However, the rule does provide for its use for purposes of admissions, impeachment by prior inconsistent statements, and any exception to the hearsay rule.22 8 If the witness
is unavailable at time of trial, the deposition may be used to introduce testimony of that witness. The rule defines unavailability in much the same terms as does the state rule, except that
it broadens the definition of unavailability to include any witness
22 9
who is more than one hundred miles from the place of trial.
Rule 26 (d) (2) also allows an adverse party to introduce, by use
of a deposition, the testimony of "any one who at the time of
taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent
2 30
of a public or private corporation, partnership, or association. 1
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 212 states: "If only a part of
a deposition is read or used at the trial by a party, any other
party may at that time read or use or require him to read any
other part of the deposition which ought in fairness to be considered in connection with the part read or used. ' '2.1 Its counterpart in the federal rules states: "If only part of a deposition is
offered in evidence by a party, an adverse party may require him
to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced,
and any party may introduce any other parts.11232 Under the
literal language of the rules, the state test is broader than the
federal rule. The state rule requires the trial court to exercise
its discretion to determine "fairness," while the federal rule requires the trial court to determine legal relevaney.23 3 But in
Smith v. City of Rock Island2 34 the Illinois appellate court stated
that the reason for the rule was "to avoid the unfairness and distortion which may result if a party is permitted to read isolated
parts of a deposition or portions out of context without permitting the opponent to read or require the other party to read other
'
relevant portions of the same deposition."215
The United States
225 ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. l10A, §212(b) (1967).

226 Powers v. Kelley, 83 Ill. App. 2d 289, 227 N.E.2d 376 (1967).
227

FED. R. Civ. P. 26.

Id. See Pursche v. Atlas Scraper & Eng'r Co., 300 F.2d 467 (9th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962) ; Spector v. El Rancho, Inc., 263
228

F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1959); Merchants Motor Freight, Inc. v. Downing, 227
F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1955); Curry v. States Marine Corp., 16 F.R.D. 376

(S.D.N.Y. 1954).
229 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(3).
230 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d) (2) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §212(e) (1967).
231 ILL. Rsv. STAT. ch. 110A, §212(c)
(1967).
232 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d) (4).
233

Schmitt v. Chicago Transit Authority, 34 Ill.App. 2d 67, 179 N.E.

2d 838 (1962).
234
235

22 Ill. App. 2d 389, 161 N.E.2d 369 (1959).
Id. at 397-98, 161 N.E.2d at 374.
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Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated a similar reason in
36
Westinghouse Electric CorporationV. Wray Equipment Corp.
The rule affords:
[A] method for averting, so far as possible, any misimpressions
from selective use of deposition testimony. The opposing party is
entitled under the rule to have the context of any statement, or any
qualifications 237
made as a part of the deponent's testimony also put
into evidence.
The court further stated:
[T]he spirit of the rule dictates that the opposing party should be
able to require the introduction of the relevant parts of the deposition testimony
at least at the conclusion of the reading of the
28
deposition.
A deposition may be taken without leave of court at any
time after all defendants have or should have appeared, pursuant
to Illinois Supreme Court rule 239 ; and after twenty days after
commencement of the action, pursuant to federal rule.2 40 Commencement of the action for this purpose has been defined as
service of summons and complaint on the defendants 241 or as
service of the answer on the plaintiff.242 The purpose of the restriction is to enable the defendant to retain counsel and to be
appraised of the claim against him. 24 3 By leave of court, a deposition may be taken prior to the time specified under the rules,
upon proof of "good cause.?244 The plaintiff is ordinarily required to demonstrate that he would be prejudiced if the deposition were not taken. 245 Once leave of court has been obtained,
the plaintiff must serve notice upon the defendants.
A party desiring to take a deposition must serve reasonable
written notice on all other parties.24 6 The notice must specify
the time and place of the deposition, and must describe the intended deponent by name or other identifying information.247
The notice need not identify the person before whom the depo236

286 F.2d 491 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied 366 U.S. 929 (1961).

2,
238
239

Id.

240

FED.

Id.

at 494.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201 (d) (1967). Small claims (under
$500.00) cases are an exception, leave of court must be obtained for all
discovery. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §§201(g), 287 (1967).

R. CIv. P. 26(a).

Application of Royal Bank, 33 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
242 Application of Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 4 F.R.D. 263
(D.N.J. 1945).
243 See Notes of Advisory Committee on Amendments to Rules following
FED. R. Civ. P. 26, 28 U.S.C.A.; Historical & Practice Notes following ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §101.19-1 (Smith-Hurd 1956). Netter v. Ashland Paper
Mills,2 4Inc., 19 F.R.D. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
4 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201(d) (1967).
245 Brause v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 19 F.R.D. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
246 American Exchange Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 82 F. 961 (9th
Cir. 1897). See Mims v. Central Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 178 F.2d 56 (5th
Cir. 1949), in which the court held that depositions of different witnesses
in scattered localities on the same date was not reasonable.
247 FED. R.Civ. P. 30(a) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §206 (1967).
241
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sition is to be taken248 nor the matter on which examination is
sought.2 41 Under the state rules, however, the notice must specify whether the deposition is for purposes of discovery or evidence. 25 0
If the deponent is a party, service of notice of deposition
alone is sufficient to require his appearance. 2 51 If he is not a
2 -2
party, a subpoena must be served to require his attendance.

If the deponent is not an individual (for example, if it is a corporation), then the deponent's representative must, under fed25 3
eral rules, be an officer or managing agent of the deponent.
Although the definition of a managing agent has caused
some difficulty, it is adequately defined in Newark Insurance
Company v. Sartain.21 4 In that case the court stated that a managing agent was a person who:
1. Acts with superior authority and is invested with general
powers to exercise his judgment and discretion in dealing with his
principal's affairs (as distinguished from a common employee, who
does only what he is told to do; has no discretion about what he can
or cannot do; and is responsible to an immediate superior who has
control over his acts) ;
2. Can be depended upon to carry out his principal's directions
to give testimony at the demand of a party engaged in litigation
with his principal; and
3. Can be expected to identify himself with2 the
55 interests of
his principal rather than those of the other party.
All other persons associated with a corporation or other association must be subpoenaed in order to obtain their appearance. 5 6
The Illinois rule contains express provisions for obtaining
the appearance of a deponent.2

51

It provides in part that "[s]erv-

ice of notice of the taking of the deposition of a party or person
who is currently an officer, director, or employee of a party is
sufficient to require the appearance of the deponent. .. ,,25
But, under the rule, persons who are not parties or are not under the control of a party such as a corporation must be served
248Norton v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 806 (N.D.N.Y. 1939)
Yonkers Raceway, Inc. v. Standardbred Owners Ass'n, Inc., 21 F.R.D. 3
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
249 Madison v. Cobb, 29 F. Supp. 881 (M.D. Pa. 1939); Lenerts v.
Rapidol Dist. Corp., 3 F.R.D. 42 (N.D.N.Y. 1942).
250 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11OA, §202 (1967).
251 Collins v. Wayland, 139 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied 322
U.S. 744; Peitzman v. City of Illmo, 141 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1944), cert.

denied 323 U.S. 718.
252 Pennsylvania R.R. v. The Marie Leonhardt, 179 F. Supp. 437 (E.D.
Pa. 1959); Czuprynski v. Shenango Furnace Co., 2 F.R.D. 412 (W.D.N.Y.
1942).
253 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(2).
254 20 F.R.D. 583 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
255 Id.
at 586.
256 Fruit Growers Co-op. v. California Pie & Baking Co., 3 F.R.D. 206
(E.D.N.Y. 1942).
25 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §204 (1967).
258 Id.
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with subpoenas in order to obtain their appearance. Subpoenas
may be served by registered or certified mail delivered to the
2 59
deponent at least seven days before the date of deposition.
The state rule also requires that leave of court be obtained
before a subpoena is issued for a physician or surgeon to appear
for deposition.2 6 0 Such a requirement, obviously designed for
the benefit of the medical profession, is entirely incompatible
with the functions of discovery.. The vast bulk of civil cases
today (to which this requirement is specifically directed) involve
personal injury litigation. These cases naturally involve at least
one medical expert, whose testimony has become an important
part of the technique of personal injury litigation.
He generally is a persuasive, fluent, impressive witness.
As such, every possible step should be taken to channel his
contributions in a direction that will serve the ends of justice. One
such step is to make his reports [by the use of discovery] as nonpartisan, objective261and scientific as are the other notable activities
of his profession.
In addition to burdening the court, counsel, and litigants with
hearings for leave to take a medical expert's deposition, the requirement for pre-subpoena hearing involves an implied determination of the relevancy of the medical facts, a matter which
ought properly to be an integral matter of the case itself. If
leave to take the deposition should be denied and if the doctor
should subsequently be called as a witness at trial, then the
functions of discovery are frustrated and the "sporting theory"
of litigation resurrected.
Depositions may be taken at those places specified in rules
or at other places variously designated by order of court.262 As
may be expected, distinctions are made between parties and nonparties in determining where a person may be required to appear. The state rule provides that, in the absence of an order
of court, a "deponent may be required to attend only in the
county in which he resides or is employed or transacts his business in person ....
,263 The rule also empowers the court to
require a nonresident plaintiff or a person under his control to
appear within or without the state on "terms and conditions
that are just. ' 264 Such power was within the common law authority of the courts to supervise discovery.
The federal rule is silent as to the place a party must ap259

1d.

26o Id.

See N.D. ILL. GEN. R. 42 which states: "No party .

shall ...

serve a subpoena . .. for a deposition upon any doctor except upon motion
and order of court."
261 Kemeny v. Skorch, 22 Il.
App. 2d 160, 170-71, 159 N.E.2d 489,
493-94 (1959).
262 FED. R. Civ. P. 45 (d) ; ILL. REv. STAT. eh.
263 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §203 (1967).
264Id.

110A, §203 (1967).
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pear for deposition. Ordinarily the deposition of the plaintiff
is taken in the district where the action is maintained, but for
convenience of the parties the court may order that it be taken
elsewhere. 265 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 requires a deponent who is a resident of the district where the deposition is
to be taken to appear "in the county wherein he resides or is
employed or transacts his business in person. ' 266 If the deponent is not a resident of the district, the rule requires him to
appear in the county in which he was served or up to forty miles
from place of service.2 67 However, as in the state rules, the court
may enter a protective order designating the place of deposition.26

The scope of examination is broad and subject to few limitations. The "[e]vidence objected to shall be taken subject to
the objection'26

(excepting of course matters which are "privi-

leged" or are "work product"). Thus, objections are ordinarily
made and recorded at the deposition and ruled upon when the
deposition is used. 270 There is, however, a provision for suspending the deposition pending a ruling on grounds that the
questions are being made in bad faith, or that they embarrass,
annoy, or oppress the deponent.27' Such an objection, unlike objections to the evidentiary value of questions, is to protect a
witness in the absence of direct judicial control over the proceedings.
Untimely objections are waived under both the state and
federal rules. 272 For example, error in the manner or form of
the notice is waived unless written objection is promptly made
to the party serving the notice. 273 Disqualification of the officer
before whom the deposition is taken is waived unless objection
is made before the taking of the deposition, or is made as soon
as the disqualification is or with reasonable diligence should be
27
known.2 7 4 Errors as to the oath, 275 competency of the witnesses, 6
265 Ginsberg v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 6 F.R.D. 371 (S.D.N.Y.
1945). 66
2

FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d) (2).

267

d.

268

Id.

P.30(c); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §206(e) (1967).
Banco Nacional v.Bank of America, 11 F.R.D. 497 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
271 FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §206(d)
(1967).
272 FED. R. Civ. P. 32; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §211 (1967).
273 Oates v.S.J. Groves & Sons, 248 F.2d 388 (6th Cir. 1957); In re
Kettles, 365 111. 168, 6 N.E.2d 146 (1936).
274 Cooper v. Cox, 31 Ill. App. 2d 51, 175 N.E.2d 651 (1961).
275 Houser v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 202 F. Supp. 181 (D. Md. 1962).
276 Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.
2d 681 (1964):
In 1959, when Susan was a little over nine years old, her discovery
deposition was taken. No objection was made by the plaintiff's attorney
to her competency.
... The objection was raised at the trial but the court properly
held that he could not then inquire into conditions which existed two
269FED. R.Civ.
270

The John Marshall Journalof Practiceand Procedure

[Vol. 2:22

form of the questions 2 7 7 and others which could also be corrected
if objections were promptly presented are waived if not made
in time to correct the error. Errors in the manner of transcription or certification are waived unless a motion to suppress
78
the deposition transcript is made with reasonable promptness.

Interrogatories
Under the Illinois rules, interrogatories may be served after
all defendants have appeared or are required to appear.2 7 9 Under
federal rules they may be served ten days after the action is
commenced.2 10 Under both rules interrogatories may be served
after commencement of the action, but prior to the time designated by the rules, with leave of court.2 8 1 The state rule states
that "[u] nless otherwise ordered, depositions and other discovery
procedures shall be conducted in the sequence in which they are
noticed or otherwise initiated.' 282 The federal rule is silent on
the question of priority, but the courts provide, by decision, substantially the same requirement as the state rule. Priority of
notice is ordinarily the basis for determining the priority of the

particular discovery procedure.2 83 But the party first serving
interrogatories does not thereby acquire priority for the purpose
of taking depositions. 2 4 The rule of priority is not applied
years before and that the objection to the taking of the deposition had
been waived.
Id. at 47, 198 N.E.2d at 683. Cf. Stowers v. Carp, 29 Ill. App. 2d 52, 172
N.E.2d 370 (1961) in which the court entered a protective order denying leave
of the defendant to take a minor's deposition on the grounds of lack of competency.
277 Cordle v. Allied Chem. Corp., 309 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1962).
Concerning the issue whether the doctor was a treating or merely an examining
physician, the court stated:
Dr. Garred's testimony was taken and submitted at the trial on
deposition. The objections now directed at the doctor's testimony were
not made at the time of taking the deposition. Objections to the competency of a witness and to the competency, relevancy and materiality
of testimony taken on deposition, are waived if not made before or during the taking of the deposition, if the ground of the objection is one
which might have been corrected if made at that time. . . . [Citations
omitted]. We think these objections fall in that category. The
doctor could have been instructed not to state the history and symptoms
as given him by the plaintiff and hypothetical questions could have
been framed, based on the history and symptoms of the plaintiff, as
his counsel must certainly have known them at that time.
Id. at 825-26. Questions calling for legal conclusions are objectionable
under the state decisions, but may not be under the federal decisions. But
under either such questions and answers thereto are not admissible. See
text at notes 326-31 infra.
278 Kawietzke v. Rarich, 198 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Cibis v.
Hunt, 48 Ill. App. 2d 487, 199 N.E.2d 246 (1964).
279 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201(d) (1967).
280

281
282
283

1966).
284

FED. R. Civ. P. 33.

FEn. R. Civ. P. 33; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201(d) (1967).
(1967).
Suplee, Yeatman, Mosley Co. v. Shapiro, 42 F.R.D. 34 (E.D. Pa.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201(e)

Dow Chem. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 26 F.R.D. 179 (D. Del. 1960).
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mechanically. Regardless of the priority of notice, the courts
may schedule the priority of the discovery procedures,2 8 5 may
stay one discovery procedure until the completion of another,28
or may provide for alternate or simultaneous discovery procedures.2 7 Furthermore, a party having priority may lose its
288
right to priority by undue delay or bad faith.
The Illinois rule provides that answers and objections to
interrogatories must be served and filed within twenty-eight
days.2 8 9 The federal rule allows fifteen days for answers and
ten days for objections to interrogatories.2 90 The state rule requires the interrogating party to notice hearing on objections to
interrogatories, on the theory that the interrogating party may
be satisfied with the information obtained from other answers
or other discovery procedures.2 91 The federal rule, on the other
hand, requires the interrogated party to notice hearing on the
objections at the earliest practicable time.2 92 Failure to notice
hearing on the objections may waive the objections.21 3 Objec-

tions to interrogatories must be timely and specific; if not, they
are ordinarily waived. 29 4
285

Should objections to a specific inter-

Kaeppler v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 200 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Pa.

1961).

286 Sprague Elec. Co. v. Cornell-Dubilier Elec. Corp., 4 F.R.D. 113
(D. Del. 1944).
287 Suplee, Yeatman, Mosley Co. v. Shapiro, 42 F.R.D. 34 (E.D. Pa.
1966); Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Pub. Co., 11 F.R.D. 156
(S.D.N.Y. 1951). See also Armstrong v. Doyle, 20 Misc.2d 1087, 193 N.Y.S.
2d 421 (1959); Huber Baking Co. v. Frank C. Sparks Co., 45 Del. 525,
76 A.2d 124 (1950), aff'd on reargument, 46 Del. 153, 81 A.2d 132 (1951).
Accord, 1967 Proposed Amendments, Rule 26(d), 43 F.R.D. 211, 228.
288 Kurt M. Jachmann Co. v. Hartley, Cooper & Co., 17 F.R.D. 263
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Caribbean Constr. Corp. v. Kennedy Van Saun Mfg. &
Eng'r Corp., 13 F.R.D. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
288 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §213(c) (1967).
290 FED. R. Civ. P. 33. But see 1967 Proposed Amendments, Rule 33(a),
43 F.R.D. 211, 250-51.
291 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §213(c) (1967).
292 FED. R. Civ. P. 33.

292 Baldwin v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 33 F.R.D. 311 (D. Del. 1963);
John v. Tribune Co., 28 Ill. App. 2d 300, 171 N.E.2d 432 (1960), rev'd on
other grounds, 24 Ill.2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
877 (1962). See Jones v. Rederai A/B Soya, 31 F.R.D. 524 (D. Md. 1962),
wherein the court stated: "Since no party has requested a hearing under
Rule 7 of this court, the objection is to be decided on the information in the
file." Id. at 525.
294 "IT]he objections must be specific and supported by a detailed explanation why the interrogatory or class of interrogatories are objectionable." United States v. NYSCO Laboratories, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 159, 161 (E.D.
N.Y. 1960).
Since the time to object to these interrogatories has expired, no objections may now be filed without special leave, which will not be
granted since no reason appears why additional time was needed to
object to the form or substance of the interrogatories.
Sturdevant v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 32 F.R.D. 426, 428 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
Dempski v. Dempski, 27 Ill.2d 69, 187 N.E.2d 734 (1963). See also Jones
v. Rederai A/B Soya, 31 F.R.D. 524 (D. Md. 1962), in which the party
objecting did not object to the substance of the interrogatories, but rather
denied its obligation to answer at all (since it was not an adverse party).
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rogatory be filed concurrently with295an answer to that interrogatory, those objections are waived.
Interrogatories, like all discovery procedures, require full,
fair disclosure. 29 Although neither rule provides for such a motion, incomplete or evasive answers are objectionable and may
be stricken on timely motion.297 Answers to interrogatories may
be used at trial for certain limited purposes such as admissions

or impeachment by prior inconsistent statement.29 8 Since interrogatories may be directed only to parties, the distinction between such impeachment and admission may be one of degree
rather than one of kind. 299 But since interrogatories and answers
thereto are not considered pleadings, 0 0 the admissions are ordinarily evidentiary, not judicial.2 0 ' As such, they are subject to
2 02
explanation.
Neither the Illinois nor the federal rule expressly limits
the number of interrogatories or sets of interrogatories which
may be served. However, both attempt to control the abusive
or vexatious use of interrogatories. The Illinois rule states that
"[i]t is the duty of an attorney directing interrogatories to restrict them to the subject matter of the particular case, to avoid
undue detail, and to avoid the imposition of any unnecessary
burden or expense on the answering party."3 03 The federal rule
states that "[t]he number of interrogatories . . . to be served
is not limited except as justice requires to protect the party from
annoyance, expense, embarrassment, or oppression. 3 0°4 Both rules
provide for additional or supplemental interrogatories2 0 5 The
Illinois rule further provides that "upon request made at any
time before the trial, a party must furnish the identity and location of persons, in addition to those previously disclosed, having knowledge of relevant facts. 2' 0 6 Since interrogatories and
295 Meese v. Eaton Mfg. Co., 35 F.R.D. 162 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
296 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201(b) (1967).
Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495 (1947).
297 Life Music, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 16 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
298 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §212 (a)
(1967).
Haskell Plumbing &
Heating Co. v. Weeks, 237 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1956).
299 Oberkircher V. Chicago Transit Authority, 41 Ill. App. 2d 68, 190
N.E.2d 170 (1963).
300 John v. Tribune Co., 28 Ill.
App. 2d 300, 171 N.E.2d 432 (1960), rev'd
on other grounds, 24 Ill.2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
877 (1962).
301 Cf. Meier v. Pocius, 17 Ill.
App. 2d 332, 150 N.E.2d 215 (1958).
302 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201 (i) (1967).
Ray v. J. C. Penney Co.,
274 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1959).
20 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §213(b)
(1967).
204 FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
Cf. Greene v. Raymond, 41 F.R.D. 11 (D. Colo.
1966), wherein the court stated: "Rule 33 does not license the unlimited
quizzing of an adverse party." Id. at 13.
30 FED. R. Civ. P. 33; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §213(e) (1967).
Diversified Prod. Corp. v. Sports Center Co., 42 F.R.D. 3 (D. Md. 1967).
206 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §213(e) (1967).
See also 1967 Proposed
Amendments, Rule 26(e)(1), 43 F.R.D. 211, 228.
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the other discovery procedures are cumulative, not alternative or
exclusive, the use of one does not necessarily preclude the use of
°
another. 0
Interrogatories may be served upon one party by another.
They may not be served on persons who are not party to the
action. Rule 213 of the Illinois Supreme Court provides that
interrogatories may be served on "any other party. ' 830 The federal rule is more limited; it provides that interrogatories may
'3 0 9
be served only on "any adverse party.
Defining an "adverse party" has produced confusing and
conflicting opinions in federal decisions. Ordinarily an "adverse
party" is defined judicially as any party on the opposite side of
an issue raised by the pleadings.3 10 For example, some decisions
state that a plaintiff and a third-party defendant are adverse
onlywhen the latter answers the original complaint.3 11 But, as
pointed out in Carey V. Schuldt,31 2 in which the plaintiff-longshoreman who sued a shipowner for injuries was allowed to
serve interrogatories on the third-party defendant-stevedore,
such decisions overlook the fact that:
[This] approach forecloses inquiry into the real issue by mechanically hinging 'adversity' on the ritualistic exchange of pleadings.
This formal ceremony does not alter the realities of the litigation.
It has no bearing on the issue of whether the parties are 'adverse.'313
The court also pointed out that:
Conflicting interests, without more, does not constitute 'adversity.'
To be 'adverse' the parties must oppose each other on an issue in
the case. 'Adversity' does not mean that one party must be seeking
a judgment or recovery against the other party. But it does mean
that one party strives to win a point at issue at the expense of the
other. When two parties are contesting an issue, and the outcome
of the litigation will be, or may be, different as to either party due
to the determination of that issue, then they are 'adverse' within
the meaning of Rule 33.314
Both the federal rule, specifying "any adverse party," and
the state rule, permitting interrogatories to be served on "any
other party," encounter a further problem - in a multiparty action, not all parties are involved in every contested issue in the
case. In such situations some facts may be relevant to a con307 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201(a) (1967).
Stonybrook Tenants
Ass'n, Inc. v. Alpert, 29 F.R.D. 165 (D. Conn. 1961); B. & S. Drilling Co.
v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 24 F.R.D. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
30
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §213(a) (1967).
309 FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
1967 Proposed Amendments, Rule 38(a), 43
F.R.D. 211, 250, deletes "adverse," 43 F.R.D. 211, 250.

31o Carey v. Schuldt, 42 F.R.D. 390 (E.D. La. 1967).

311 See, e.g., Dziedzina v. Dolphin Tanker Corp., 31 F.R.D. 249 (E.D.
Pa. 1962).

F.R.D. 390 (E.D. La. 1967).
31 Id. at 394.
14Id. at 393.
31242
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tested issue between two parties; and some facts may be irrelevant to the same issue, between the same parties, and yet be
relevant to the case as a whole. Thus a party may direct an
interrogatory seeking facts relevant to the case as a whole and
yet not relevant to any contested issue between the interrogating
party and the interrogated party. The federal rule, at least,
permits interrogatories to be directed to any facts relevant to
the case as a whole. 315 Since such information could presumably
be obtained by other discovery procedures regardless of whether
the interrogated party were a party to the action, there appears
to be no reason other than expense to limit the interrogatories
to contested issues, and this is a matter for which the court may
provide in any event.
Both rules provide that if written interrogatories are served
on a party other than an individual, the sworn answers "shall
be made by an officer, partner, or agent, who shall furnish such
'
information as is available to the party. 'a1
This provision
raises three important questions: the first concerns the definition of "agent"; the second, the extent to which an agent can
truthfully swear to the answers of the party; and the third, the
extent of the obligation to collect and compile information in
order to answer.
A clear definition of "agent" is important if sanctions are
sought to be imposed or if the answers are to be used at trial.
The choice of the individual to make the answers rests with the
interrogated party, but he should be one who meets the requirements for an adverse witness, for example a managing agent. 1 7
Information is considered available to a party, individual or
115Carey v. Schuldt, 42 F.R.D. 390 (E.D. La. 1967).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §213(c) (1967). See also FED. R. Civ. P.
33 which omits the word "partner."
317 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §60 (1967).
Cf. Day V. Illinois Power Co.,
50 Ill.
App. 2d 52, 199 N.E.2d 802 (1964).
In the final analysis, the cited cases have reached the conclusion that
a managing agent of a corporation, partnership or association is any
person who:
1. Acts with superior authority and is invested with general powers
to exercise his judgment and discretion in dealing with his principal's
affairs (as distinguished from a common employee, who does only what
he is told to do; has no discretion about what he can or cannot do;
and is responsible to his immediate superior who has control over his
316

acts) ;

2. Can be depended upon to carry out his principal's directions
to give testimony at the demand of a party engaged in litigation with
his principal; and
3. Can be expected to identify himself with the interests of his
principal rather than those of the other party.
Newark Ins. Co. v. Sartain, 20 F.R.D. 583, 586 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
[Tihird party defendant's contention that third party plaintiff's attorney was not the proper person to answer the interrogatory is not
well taken. His further contention that said attorney's answer would
not be binding on the corporation is groundless.
Segarra v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 41 F.R.D. 245, 248 (D.P.R. 1966). Contra,
Pitman v. Florida Citrus Exch., 2 F.R.D. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
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otherwise, if its attorney is in possession of it.318 This raises a
perplexing problem. An attorney, for example, may concurrently represent both the trustees and the beneficiary of a land
trust or he may concurrently represent two related corporations.
In such situations the attorney has access to information from
both entities. The rules requiring full disclosure would seem to
demand that answers of one entity be made from all information
in possession of either entity.
Ordinarily, in any multi-individual entity such as a partnership or corporation several individuals know some, but not all,
of the facts contained in sworn answers to interrogatories. An
individual swearing to the truthfulness of the answers of the
parties will probably not have personal knowledge of all the
facts contained in the responses. Thus the facts contained in
the answers will have little if any evidentiary value. If the facts
are to possess evidentiary value, either several individuals must
swear to the answers, or complete knowledge must be imputed
to the individual swearing to the truthfulness of the answers' 19
If the latter is the case, the individual should qualify his answers
to indicate the sources of the facts.
The extent to which a party is required to collect or compile
information to make full disclosure in its answers is determined
on the facts of each case.320 Although the decisions are often
at odds, general patterns are discernable. Interrogatories are
considered improper if they require compilations from material
not in the possession of the interrogated party.321 If the material is generally available, or is made available, and if it requires
no special skill to interpret, interrogatories requiring compilation to answer are considered proper. 32 2 But if special skills
are required for interpretation, compilation may be required,
with reasonable expenses of the compilation being awarded. As
a practical matter, simple compilation from material in the possession of the interrogated party will generally be required.3 23
Some of the confusion created by interrogatories has been
alleviated by the Illinois rule's express, and the federal rule's
318 "Full and honest answers . . . would necessarily have included all
pertinent information gleaned by [counsel,] through his interviews with

the witnesses."

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947).

Accord,

Segarra v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 41 F.R.D. 245, 248 (D.P.R. 1966). Cf.
McNealy v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 43 Ill. App. 2d 460, 193 N.E.2d 879 (1963),
wherein the court held that answers to interrogatories signed by an attorney
cannot be used to impeach the individual party, or as admissions.
319 Drum v. Town of Tonawanda, 13 F.R.D. 317 (W.D.N.Y. 1952).
320 Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 15 F.R.D. 242 (N.D. Ill. 1954).
321 Stanzler v. Loew's Theatre & Realty Corp., 19 F.R.D. 286 (D.R.I.
1955).
322 Life Music, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 16 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); Brown v. Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co., 8 F.R.D. 107 (W.D.N.Y.
1948); Cinema Amusements, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 318 (D. Del.
1947).
323 Pappas v. Loew's, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 471 (M.D. Pa. 1953).
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implied, provision that an interrogated party may simply make
available to the interrogating party those documents or material
containing the answer, rather than making an answer.'2 4 In
some instances this provision may also alleviate the problem of
an interrogatory calling for the interpretation of a document. 3"'
For example, consider the case of a liability automobile insurer
defending the insured under a reservation of rights. If the insured were to answer an interrogatory asking if there were
coverage, it might find itself bound, or at least embarrassed, by
that answer in a subsequent garnishment action if it chose eventually to deny coverage. Under the present posture of the rules,
the insured could provide the interrogating party or its attorney
with the policy of automobile liability insurance, thus permitting the interrogating party or its attorney to determine the
probability of coverage.
The Illinois courts have refused to permit interrogatories
to ask for conclusions, or presumably, opinions.2 6 The federal
courts in some cases have permitted, and in other cases not permitted, such interrogatories.' 7 "But any rule which attempts
to make rigid distinction between matters of fact and mere conclusions is bound to be unworkable.

. .

.

It is now understood

that the difference between 'fact' and 'opinion' or 'conclusion' is
a difference of degree rather than of kind.")2 8 The proper test
of the propriety of an interrogatory is stated in Stonybrook Ten2
ants Association, Inc. v. Alpert:" 9
It is possible that some of the interrogatories propounded by
the defendants call for opinions, contentions or conclusions. The
correct approach in passing on the propriety of interrogatories in
that respect is set out in Taylor v. Sound Steamship Lines, 100 F.

Supp. 388, at 389 (D. Conn. 1951).

In deciding that case, Chief

Judge Hincks said: 'The applicable test, I think, should not be left
to fine-spun distinctions between "knowledge" and belief based upon
information from other sources. Rather, it is the practical test
which has been well stated by Professor Moore when he poses the
question "would an answer serve any substantial purpose." 2330
Pappas v. Loew's, Inc.,
324 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §213(d) (1967).
13 F.R.D. 471 (M.D. Pa. 1953).

1967 Proposed Amendments, Rule 33(c), 43

F.R.D. 211, 252, contains an express provision similar to that of Illinois.
However, one cannot require an interrogated party to attach documents
to interrogatories without a court order obtained on a showing of good cause.
Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949).
325 Pappas v. Loew's, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 471 (M.D. Pa. 1953).
226 Dempski v. Dempski, 27 Ill.2d 69, 187 N.E.2d 734 (1963); Carlson
v. Healey, 69 Ill. App. 2d 236, 215 N.E.2d 831 (1966).
'27B. & S. Drilling Co. v. Hallburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 24
F.R.D. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
328

C.

WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS

§86, at 331

(1963). "While some courts have held that the discovery procedure is limited to the ascertainment of facts and nothing else, the line between fact
and conclusion is frequently an uncertain and illogical one." B. & S. Drilling
Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 24 F.R.D. 1, 7 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
329 29 F.R.D. 165 (D. Conn. 1961).
330 Id. at 168.
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Regardless of whether such an interrogatory is allowed or not,
an answer to it is not admissible at trial.331
A persistent and vexatious problem in interrogatory procedure arises when an interrogated party presents, as a witness to
the transaction or occurrence, an individual whose name was not
listed in response to the interrogatory seeking the names and
location of such persons. 3 2 The immediate dilemma is Whether
or not to permit such a witness to testify. To do so may frustrate the function of discovery and lead to a return of the "sporting theory" of litigation. Not to do so may unjustly exclude
relevant, material evidentiary facts.
Although neither the Illinois nor federal rules expressly
provide for this problem, the decisions recognize the power of
the court to exclude the testimony of a witness not listed in answers to appropriate interrogatories. 33 3 The sanction is discretionary and each case must be decided on its own facts. A
distinction is made between unlisted witnesses known before
answering the interrogatory, and those discovered after answering. In the former situation and in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the exclusionary sanction at the very least
is imposed. 84 But in the latter situation the question arises as
33' H. B. Zachry Co. v. O'Brien, 378 F.2d 423 (10th Cir. 1967) ; Harris
v. Minardi, 74 Ill. App. 2d 262, 220 N.E.2d 39 (1966); Carlson v. Healey,
69 Ill. App. 2d 236, 215 N.E.2d 831 (1966); Kamholtz v. Stepp, 31 Ill. App.
2d 357, 176 N.E.2d 388 (1961).
332 The problem is not confined to witnesses, but extends to evidentiary
facts. See Lunn v. United Aircraft Corp., 25 F.R.D. 186 (D. Del. 1960).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §204(a) (1) (1967) which requires leave of court
to take the deposition of a medical expert presents a similar problem. If
leave to take the expert's deposition is denied, may the expert testify to
matters not revealed in his records at trial?
333 Wright v. Royse, 43 Ill. App. 2d 267, 193 N.E.2d 340 (1963).
The
propriety of the sanction presupposes that use is made of discovery. See
Halverson v. Campbell Soup Co., 374 F.2d 810 (7th Cir. 1967), in which
the court reversed the trial court for excluding the defendant's witness, on
motion of the plaintiff who had not filed interrogatories, whose testimony
went to the injuries alleged by the plaintiff and whose name was not listed
in defendant's answers to interrogatories served by the third party defendant.
334 Dempski v. Dempski, 27 Ill.2d 69, 187 N.E.2d 734 (1963)
(Neighbors) ; Greenberg v. Karris, 80 Ill. App. 2d 270, 225 N.E.2d 490 (1967)
(Fellow-employee who was with plaintiff at time in question) ; Dickeson v.
Baltimore & 0. C. T. R. RI., 73 Ill. App. 2d 5, 220 N.E.2d 43 (1965) :
We find that the railroads could not have been prejudiced by the introduction of this testimony. In addition, we note that the appellants,
after discovering that the witness did not live at the address stated
in the interrogatories, did nothing until her testimony was offered at
the trial. We feel the appellants were not complying with the spirit
of Sec. 58 (3) of the Civil Practice Act, in not calling the attention of the
appellee's attorney to this error. It would be cruelly unjust to permit a
party to sit idly by, knowing an error had been made, and then ask to
have a witness excluded when the time came for trial. A simple telephone call would have produced the correct address; we do not think
that is too much to ask in the interests of justice.
Id. at 29, 220 N.E.2d at 54; Rosales v. Marquez, 55 Ill. App. 2d 203, 204
N.E.2d 829 (1965) (Witness listed as living in Mexico, but lived in
Chicago); Battershell v. Bowman Dairy Co., 37 Ill. App. 2d 193, 185 N.E.2d
340 (1961) (Witness with a common name whose address interrogated
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to whether the interrogated party is under a continuing duty
to supply names of witnesses or facts discovered after answering interrogatories. "Some district courts have adopted a rule
imposing a continuing duty to make disclosure of such informa-

' 33 5
tion; others impose it without a rule, but this is not uniform.

The Illinois courts have refused to impose, either by rule or by

33 6
decision, a continuing duty to answer interrogatoriesY.

HOw-

ever, considerable case law has developed to avoid the dilemma

presented when an unlisted witness is called to testify at trial.
In those cases in which the exclusionary sanction is not imposed, various factors are considered, for example, presence of
minimal surprise, 8 7 whether the surprise or prejudice may be
alleviated by recessing for a formal or informal deposition,13 8 or
9
whether the testimony was merely cumulative and corrobative. 3

Further, counsel in closing argument may comment on an un3 0
listed witness in order to affect the weight of the testimony.

4

Production of Documents
In keeping with the purpose of modern discovery to facilitate
pretrial disclosure, both the United States and Illinois Supreme

Courts have provided by rule3 41 for the production of documents
for inspection, copying, reproduction or photographing and also
permit access to real estate for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying or photographing. The scope of the discovery
available under the rules providing for production of documents
is subject to the general limitations, in Illinois, of Rule 201342

and in the federal courts to "the matters within the scope of
the examination permitted by Rule 26 (b).,8
Since this method of discovery will be referred to throughparty could have readily located, but was listed with no address).
35 F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE §6.4, at 191 (1965).
See 1967 Proposed Amendments, Rule 26(e)(1), 43 F.R.D. 211, 228.
IT]he defendant is bound to give truthful answers to the interrogatories and . . . both good faith and the spirit of the Rule require it to
see to it that its answers are truthful as of the time of the trial as well
as of the time when the interrogatories are answered.
McNally v. Yellow Cab Co., 16 F.R.D. 460, 460 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
336 Quatrano v. Marrocco, 61 Ill. App. 2d 1, 208 N.E.2d 632 (1965).
337 Ferraro v. Augustine, 45 Ill. App. 2d 295, 196 N.E.2d 16 (1964).
338 Dickeson v. Baltimore & O.C.T.R.R., 73 Ill. App. 2d 5, 220 N.E.2d
43 (1965) (Psychologist employed after interrogatories answered) ; Freeman v. Chicago Transit Authority, 50 Ill. App. 2d 125, 200 N.E.2d 128
(1964), aff'd 33 Ill.2d 103, 210 N.E.2d 191 (1965) (Engineer used to introduce plat of intersection) ; Miksatka v. Illinois N. Ry., 49 Ill. App. 2d 258,
199 N.E.2d 74 (1964); Hansel v. Friemann, 38 Ill. App. 2d 259, 187 N.E.
2d 97 (1962).
339 Hansel v. Friemann, 38 Ill. App. 2d 259, 187 N.E.2d 97 (1962).
340 Deeke v. Steffke Freight Co., 50 Ill. App. 2d 1, 199, N.E.2d 442
(1964).

341 FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
1967 Proposed Amendments, Rule 34(a), 43
F.R.D. 211, 255, adds testing and sampling of tangibles. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110A, §214 (1967).
342 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201 (1967).
43

FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
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out as "production of documents," it should be made clear that
the term "documents" is widely inclusive. Under Illinois Rule
214, "[t]he word 'documents' . . . includes, but is not limited to
papers, photographs, films, recordings, memoranda, books, records, accounts, and communications." 3 44 The wording, slightly
expanded to include recordings, reiterates former Illinois Supreme Court Rule 16-1.34 5 In addition, the Illinois rule encompasses the examination of tangible objects and permits access
to real estate. Similarly, federal Rule 34 provides for discovery of "documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects, or tangible things8' 46 and also permits entry upon land.
Both the Illinois 4 7 and federal34s rules provide for production of documents by leave of court or motion at any time after
the filing of a complaint. However, the general provisions of
Illinois Rule 201 provide that "[p]rior to the time all defendants
have appeared or are required to appear, no deposition or other
discovery procedure shall be noticed or otherwise initiated without leave of court granted upon good cause shown. 134 9 Although
the federal courts have ample authority under the rules to allow
production of documents before the defendant has filed his answer, 3 0 they may at their discretion deny a motion under rule
34 until the answer has been filed.3 5 The court may deny a
motion filed prior to the defendant's answer, on grounds of in352
sufficient showing of relevancy, lack of "good cause," or both,
with provision for renewing the motion after the answer has
been filed. 35 3 In cases where production of documents is sought
in an Illinois court prior to the defendant having filed his appearance, the same considerations, including the need for showing "good cause," would seem to apply.
That a party must, at the least, file a complaint before he
may obtain production of documents appears to be the minimum
requirement of the Illinois and federal rules. In Sullivan v.
344 ILL. REV. STAT. ch.

345ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
346 FED. R. CIV. P. 34.

11OA, §201(b) (1) (1967).
110, §101.16-1 (1965).

347 "At any time after the commencement of an action any party may
move for an order . ..
" ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §21.4 (1967).
348 "Upon motion of any party . . . the court in which an action is
pending may (1) order any party to produce. . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
1967 Proposed Amendments, Rule 34(a), 43 F.R.D. 211, 255-56, permits
proceeding upon serving of a request without having to show good cause.
349 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11OA, §201(d) (1967).
35oSee United States v. North Coast Transp. Co., 8 F.R.D. 62 (W.D.
Wash. 1947).
851 "[ilt is not the purpose of the rule to encourage unnecessary and
vexatious discovery. There is no good purpose to be served by extensive
discovery as to matters which will not be contested. Consequently, the court
may refuse discovery until after an answer has been filed." W. BARRON &
A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §800, at 460 (Rules ed. 1961).
352See
Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. E. F. Drew & Co., 13
F.R.D. 127 (D. Del. 1952).
353See Piest v. Tide Water Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
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Dickson,"' when a state prisoner, who had had denied a number
of petitions for a writ of habeas corpus but did not have any
such petitions pending, filed a "Motion for a Subpoena Duces
Tecum," the court of appeals treated the motion as one under
rule 34 and denied it, stating: "[T]here is no mechanism in
federal civil procedure by which the relief requested, inspection
[of documents], can be granted in the absence of a pending proceeding." 355 But rule 27,356 which provides for depositions for
perpetuating testimony, and in particular its provision that "the
court may make orders of the character provided for by Rules
34 and 35,' 317 has been interpreted to allow obtaining production
of documents before a suit has been commenced.5 8 Although
the language of rule 27 (a) (3) seems to limit obtaining production of documents only when a deposition is to be taken, it has
been held that it does not:
In our opinion, a party may, in a proper case, proceed under
Rule 27 for an order under Rule 34 without taking a deposition at
all, and we think that this is such a case.
As originally promulgated, Rule 27 contained no reference to
Rule 34 or Rule 35, and for that reason it was held in Egan v.
Moran Towing & Transportation Co., D.C.S.D.N.Y., 26 F. Supp. 621
(1939), that advantage could not be taken of Rule 34 in a proceeding under Rule 27. As a result of this decision, there was added to
the second sentence of Rule 27(a) (3), which read: 'The deposition
may then be taken in accordance with these rules', a semicolon followed by: 'and the court may make orders of the character provided
for by Rules 34 and 35'. In this connection, the Advisory Committee on Amendments to Rules says 'Since the second sentence in
subdivision (a) (3) refers only to depositions, it is arguable that
Rules 34 and 35 are inapplicable in proceedings to perpetuate testimony. The new matter clarifies'. (28 U.S.C.A. Rules 17 to 33,
p. 353)
The clarification, however, is unclear. It is arguable that, read
literally, the amendment permits the use of Rules 34 and 35 only
when a deposition is to be taken. We think that the purpose - and
common sense - should prevail over the awkward form in which
the amendment is cast. The purpose is to make Rules 34 and 35
applicable in proceedings to perpetuate testimony. Common sense
says that there will be cases in which they should be applicable
where a deposition is not necessary or appropriate. It may frequently occur that the only thing likely to be lost or concealed is
a paper or object that should be subject to inspection, etc., under
Rule 34, or the physical or mental condition of a party, who should
be subject to physical or mental examination by a physician under
Rule 35. In such cases, the party seeking to perpetuate such evidence should not be required to couple his request with a request
that a deposition be taken. We do not think that the language of
amended Rule 27(a) (3) compels such a requirement. Mr. Moore
F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 984 (1965).
3 Id. at 727.
354283

56 FED. R. Civ. P. 27.

57 FED. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(3).
358 See Martin v. Reynolds Metals Corp., 297 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1961).
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agrees with us (4 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed. Sec. 27.13, p.
1829). The conjunctive form of the sentence can and should be
interpreted to mean that the right to a rule 34 order, like the right
to take a deposition, depends upon the making of a proper showing,
mentioned in the preceding sentence.3 59
The court's argument that production of documents under rule
27 be allowed without deposition finds additional support in the
fact that a party may obtain the production of documents from
a person to be deposed pursuant to rule 27 by serving him with
a subpoena duces tecum pursuant to rule 45(d).30 In Illinois,
rule 217361 provides for the taking of depositions for the purpose of perpetuating testimony. The person being deposed may
be served with a subpoena which "may command the person to
'
whom it is directed to produce documents or tangible things. ""
If the deponent is a party he may be served with a notice of the
taking of the deposition which "is sufficient to require the appearance of the deponent and the production of any documents
or tangible things listed in the notice. 3 63 However, the Illinois
rules contain no language which can be interpreted to allow the
production of documents prior to the filing of a complaint without taking a deposition.
While neither the Illinois nor the federal rules for obtaining production of documents contain any express limitation and,
in fact, are broadly worded with respect to the time available
to obtain production of documents, the courts have imposed
temporal limitations. In Savannah Theatre Co. V. Lucas & Jenkins,U 4 a case which had been pending for more than five years,
the plaintiff filed a motion for production of a large number of
documents approximately one month prior to an already once
postponed trial date. In denying the motion, the court held that
such a motion would be granted only in the face of extraordinary circumstances justifying not only the late filing of the
motion but also the probable resultant delay of the trial.3 65 A
351 Id. at 55-56.
360 FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d).
3( ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §217 (1967).
362 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §204(a) (1)
(1967).
:3 Id.at (a) (3).
364 8 FED. RuLEs SERv. 34.12, Case 2 (S.D. Ga. 1944).
365
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relating to discovery are
of course to be given a liberal construction to effectuate their manifest
purpose to remove the element of chance and surprise from the actual
trial and to provide a means whereby the parties may actually prepare
their case so that the conduct of litigation and the administration of
justice may be effected without lost motion. These rules in themselves
provide no time limit within which the parties are required to proceed
to secure the discovery authorized by the rules. However this feature
is in effect provided for by the power of the court to control as to each
of the methods of discovery the manner and extent of the investigation
permitted and in which the propriety of time of application is necessarily included. No precise rule governing every case can be deduced.
Circumstances vary with cases and even as to particular matters in a
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necessary though not sufficient element of the "extraordinary
circumstances" required by Judge Russell in Savannah is that
of diligence in pursuing pre-trial discovery. In Illinois "[t]he
trial of a case shall not be delayed to permit discovery unless due
diligence is shown.1366 The mere fact that discovery of documents is sought shortly before trial will not automatically result
in denial of the motion, providing that the party seeking the discovery has been diligent, and that granting the motion will not
7
delay the trialY
Although not specifically precluded by the language of either

the Illinois or federal rules, the rules for obtaining production of
documents as a part of pre-trial procedure are not to be used

for obtaining the production of documents during trial.3 68 During trial, documents may be obtained by the use of a subpoena
duces tecum, 60 or by notice in Illinois, providing that the witness
is a party.370
case. In this case a similar motion relating to other documents was
presented after the trial date and objections thereto overruled because
of the circumstances. The normal use and function of rule 34 is to
facilitate the preparation for trial, and it is clear that in ordinary
circumstances any motion desired for this purpose should be brought
on in ample time before the trial date for its orderly disposition. If
extraordinary circumstances arise or information comes to light the
existence of which could not reasonably have been foreseen which would
justify a late and most tardy motion under such rule, it is certainly
incumbent upon the moving party to establish them. In such circumstances it is evident that the establishment of such circumstances or
recent development is an element of the 'good cause' which the moving
party must show. On this motion no such cause is shown.
Id. at 637.
366 ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 110A, §201(f) (1967).
367 Thomas v. Pennsylvania R.R., 7 F.R.D. 610, 611 (E.D.N.Y. 1947):
[T]his motion is made in good faith by plaintiff and not with any
intention to delay the trial and . . . counsel for plaintiff has not been

guilty of laches, but is diligent in preparation for the approaching trial
and sincerely feel's that this inspection of these written statements should
be seen by him before the trial takes place and that such inspection can
be made without delay of the trial or hardship on the part of the defendant. In my opinion, Rule 34 is here the proper remedy available to the
plaintiff.
368 United States v. American Optical Co., 2 F.R.D. 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1942),
wherein the court stated:
It seems to me that Rule 34, although for some undisclosed reason no
time limit is fixed in it, properly is intended to be a part of the very
elaborate pre-trial procedure provided by the new Federal Rules, which
enables the parties to marshal the facts and documents necessary to the
trial of a cause, before the trial begins.
As a consequence a motion under Rule 34 may be granted, if ever
as of right, I think, only before the trial of a cause has begun.
After the trial has begun, the granting of a motion for discovery
under Rule 34 lies wholly, I think, within the discretion of the Judge
trying the cause.
Id. at 536-37.
369 [Alfter the trial begins the plaintiff always may avail himself in case during the trial there is opened, as is here claimed, new vistas
of fact - of a subpoena duces tecum for the production of documents
and papers. That, in my opinion, is the proper procedure after the
trial has begun.
Id. at 537.
370 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §237 (1967).
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75

71
Federal Rule 34 is limited to parties to the pending action,
' 372
"though unlike Rule 33 it is not confined to 'adverse parties'.
The Illinois rule contains no such limitation and, in fact, expressly states that "any party may move for an order directing
any other party or person to produce...
,,.7.1 The language
reiterates former Illinois Supreme Court Rule 17. 31 4 In a case
3

in which the trial court refused the plaintiff's motion, under the
former Illinois rule, for the production of the account books of
a corporation not a party to the suit, on appeal the Illinois Appellate Court reversed and held that "[rule 17] provides that
not only a party but any other person may be ordered 'to produce.

. . .

11375

Although federal Rule 34 is available only for obtaining
documents in the "possession, custody, or control ' 1 76 of a party
to the suit, discovery of documents in the possession, custody or
control of a non-party may nevertheless be obtained 77 by the
use of federal Rules 26 and 45. But rules 26 and 45 cannot be

used as a substitute for rule

34378

unless the documents are be-

371 See, e.g., Jobson v. Henne, 35 F.R.D. 37 (W.D.N.Y. 1964).
372 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §793,
at 401 (Rules ed. 1961). But see C. F. Simonin's Sons, Inc. v. American
Can Co., 26 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1939) (dictum), wherein the court stated:
It is plain that Rule 33 providing for interrogatories contemplates that
they shall be addressed only to an adverse party in a pending action.
The same is true of the procedure for production of documents, etc.,

under Rule 34.
Id. at 420.

313 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §214 (1967).
37
4 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §101.17 (1965).

375 Abstract at 2, Talbot Mills, Inc. v. Benezra, 61 Ill. App. 2d 348,
210 N.E.2d 559 (1965).
376 FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
But see Bifferato v. States Marine Corp., 11
F.R.D. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), wherein the plaintiff's motion for the production of documents in the possession of defendant's attorney was granted,
the court stating:
Rule 34 specifically permits discovery and inspection of matter which is
in the 'possession, custody, or control' of a party. Possession by an
attorney or a third party of the document or matter required to be

produced cannot be used as a means of avoiding compliance with a direction for its production.

The true test is control and not possession.

Id. at 46.

377
Rule 34 deals with discovery and inspection of documents independently of deposition. By that rule only documents in possession or
control of a party to the action may be reached. But it seems plain
that by virtue of other rules, Rule 26 and Rule 45, inspection of documents in possession of one who is not a party may be ordered as an
adjunct to the deposition of the person who has the documents. Rule
45 deals with subpoenas, and in paragraph (d) it provides: 'A subpoena
commanding the production of documentary evidence on the taking of a

deposition shal not be used without an order of the court.' This is the
same as saying that on order of the court the production of documents
on the taking of a deposition may be compelled by appropriate subpoena. There is no express restriction to documents in possession of
a party, and no reason exists for implying such a restriction.
Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 27 F. Supp. 121,
122 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
378 A subpoena duces tecum, under Rule 45, is not intended as a
substitute for a motion to produce under Rule 34, where, as in this
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ing sought for such limited purposes as refreshing the memory
of the deponent 79 or verifying the documents which the deponent used to refresh his memory.380 The procedure whereby

documents may be obtained at a deposition by listing the documents in the deposition notice is not available in the federal
courts.3 81 The Illinois courts have not yet ruled upon the use
3 82
of depositions in combination with a subpoena duces tecum,
3 83
or, in the case of a party, the use of a notice listing documents
as a substitute for obtaining production of documents under Illinois Rule 214.
Proceeding to obtain documents under federal Rules 26
and 45 does not evade the burden imposed by rule 34 of showing

"good cause," although it does shift the burden of proceeding.384
case, the subpoena requires production of documents under the control
of plaintiff, as distinguished from documents in the possession and control of an independent witness.
Wirtz v. Local 169, AFL-CIO, 37 F.R.D. 349, 351 (D. Nev. 1965).
319 Hall Bartlett Prod., Inc. v. Republic Pictures Corp., 20 F.R.D. 625
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
380 Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
381 See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Loew's Int'l
Corp., 18 F.R.D. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
382 See text at note 362 supra.
3183See text at note 363 supra.
384
Because plaintiff seeks disclosure through alternative means,
i.e., by deposition or through examination of documents within defendant's control, which are in turn founded on rules having substantial
disparities in language and approach, it must be determined initially
whether different standards are to be applied in determining the scope
of permissible examination under each. Rule 26 allows parties to proceed to take depositions without leave of court, while 30(b) establishes a protective function to be exercised by the court only after
the examination touches upon disputed matter. Rule 34, however,
allows inspection of documents within a party's control only after a
court order has been secured. This disparity in method arguably may
indicate that the requirements imposed by 34 are stricter than those
under 26 and 30(b). Under this interpretation, a party barred from
examination of a document by 34 might still be allowed to inquire
as to its contents under 26. Rule 34, however, specifically incorporates
the scope of examination allowed by 26(b) and is 'subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b).' This language clearly demonstrates that although the method by which the parties must proceed under each
rule differs, there is no disparity between 26 and 34 in the legal
standards which must be applied when a question as to the scope of
permissible examination arises in a particular case. This accords with
common sense, for 26 should not become a means to circumvent 34, see
E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., D.C.D. Del.
1959, 23 F.R.D. 237, and the requirements of 34 should not be so strict
as to force a party to use only the unreliable device of oral testimony
to discover what is accurately set out on paper. What is said henceforth in reference to documents should, therefore, be considered applicable to examination upon deposition also.
Because there is no disparity in legal standards between Rules 26
and 34, there is also no formal burden of persuasion imposed on either
party. Both 30(b) and 34 refer to the loose term 'good cause' as the
governing principle, although in the former, the party desiring to withhold must make the showing, while in the latter, the 'burden' falls upon
the party seeking discovery. This 'burden,' however, is not a burden of
persuasion but simply governs the order in which each party must
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Under rule 34, the movant must make an affirmative showing of
"good cause" either in the motion or by a supporting affidavit.
The showing must be complete and explicit as the court is not
3 15
under any duty to search out "good cause.1
What constitutes good cause takes into account considerations
of practical convenience. Barron & Holtzoff state that 'the court
should be satisfied that the production of the requested document
is necessary to enable a party to prepare his case or that it will
facilitate proof or aid in the progress of the trial.' 83
"Although Rule 45 does not in terms require a showing of
good cause for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, that requirement of Rule 34 has been read into all procedures for obtaining discovery of documents ' 38 7 from parties3 88 as well as
non-parties. 8 9 Since there is no "good cause" requirement for

obtaining production of documents in Illinois 39 ° unless the documents are sought prior to the defendant having appeared, 391 and
since rule 214 is not limited to parties, there would seem to be

no reason to resort to the provisions of Illinois Rule 204 (a)3 92
in an attempt to evade rule 214. But it is to be noted that while
rule 214 does not require a "showing of good cause" it does
require the party seeking to obtain production of documents to
proceed by motion. This suggests a reluctance on the part of
the Illinois Supreme Court to allow parties to seek the produc-

tion of documents without some direct court control, however,
negative: the motion cannot be obviously devoid of "good cause."
present his case. This is evident from the nature of 'good cause' itself,
for although the rules establish it as a standard, it has no frame of
reference. The Court's decision, therefore, ultimately is no more than
a comparative evaluation of competing claims of need and prejudice.
But to inject notions of burden of persuasion into an analysis of such
a subjective nature is to create a disparity in legal standards between
26 and 34, a result contrary to the language and philosophy of the
discovery rules.
United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213, 216-17 (D. Del.
1960).
311See Martin v. Capital Transit Co., 170 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
386 Roebling v. Anderson, 257 F.2d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
387 Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 31, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
388 Hall Bartlett Prod., Inc. v. Republic Pictures Corp., 20 F.R.D.
625 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
389 Sagorsky v. Malyon, 12 F.R.D. 486 (S.D.N.Y.
1952).
390
We have considered the propriety of requiring under the Illinois
discovery practice, as under Federal Rule 34 (Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.
Rule 34, 28 U.S.C.A.), that 'good cause' be shown before otherwise
properly discoverable material, or material ordinarily protected from
discovery under a broader 'work product' doctrine than the one adopted
here, need be disclosed. We have concluded that the attendant problems which arise under the 'good cause' doctrine render adoption of
that theory undesirable.
Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Il'l.2d 351, 360, 221 N.E.2d 410, 417 (1966). The
possibility of the court having confused the concepts of "good cause" and
"necessity" has been previously discussed, see text at note 163 supra.
391 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §201(d)
(1967).
:192
See text at notes 382-83 supra.
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"The production of documents may not be required by interrogatories under Rule 33 "'393 nor may interrogatories be used
to obtain a "summarization or resume of a document, '39 4 since
"Rule 33 is not to be used to circumvent the requirement of
showing good cause set forth in Rule 34."395 As noted, there is
no "good cause" requirement under rule 214. Furthermore, the
Illinois rule provides:
When the answer to an interrogatory may be obtained from
documents in the possession or control of the party on whom the
interrogatory was served, it shall be a sufficient answer to the interrogatory to specify those documents and to afford the party serving
the interrogatory a reasonable opportunity to inspect the documents
and to make copies thereof or compilations, abstracts, or "Summaries
therefrom.3 9 6

However,
rogatories
is served,
substitute

the option to produce documents in answer to interremains with the party upon whom the interrogatory
and interrogatories are not intended to be used as a
for properly proceeding under rule 214.

While depositions or interrogatories may be used to obtain
information about the existence or control of documents which
a party may later wish to inspect, 97 depositions or interrogatories need not necessarily be used prior to moving for production under Illinois Rule 214398 or federal Rule 34.399

But in Illi-

39 United States v. Loew's, Inc., 23 F.R.D. 178, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
394 Coyne v. Monongahela Connecting R.R., 24 F.R.D. 357, 358 (W.D.
Pa. 1959).
395 Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pistorino & Co., 28 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.
Mass. 1961).
396 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, §213(d)
(1967).
397 "Ordinarily, where
a party does not have sufficient information to
designate the documents that he desires to inspect he may acquire the information by use of interrogatories and depositions." Houdry Process Corp.
v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 24 F.R.D. 58, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
398
While appellants maintain that each document sought must be
specifically designated, and that if it is not known whether a particular
document exists and is in the possession of appellants, plaintiff must by
discovery deposition [citation omitted] and interrogatory [citation
omitted] ascertain these facts before proceeding for discovery under
Rule 17, it is apparent to us that the rule does not so contemplate.
That discovery procedures were designed to be flexible and adaptable
to the infinite variety of cases and circumstances appearing in the
trial courts is clear from the language of the rule: 'A party may at
any time move for an order' of production, and the court may 'make
any order that may be just.' Provisions permitting greater flexibility
or conferring wider discretion would be difficult to formulate, and it is,
in our judgment, clear that resort to interrogatories and discovery depositions is not a necessary condition precedent to a motion for discovery
of material, possession of which has not been theretofore definitely
established in the party from whom production is sought. No other
conclusion is compatible with the concluding provision of Rule 17 that
in those instances where the party from whom production is requested
denies possession or control, 'he may be ordered to submit to examination in open court or by deposition regarding the same.'
Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill.2d 351, 355-56, 221 N.E.2d 410, 414 (1966).
United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 7 F.R.D. 256
399
(S.D.N.Y. 1946).
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nois some question has now arisen regarding the need for prior
use of interrogatories"' due to the statement in People ex rel.

General Motors Corporationv. Bua4°1 that:
[T]he production of post-1961 documents ought not have been
ordered without some preliminary showing of materiality and relevancy. If such materiality or relevancy does exist we would think
that this could be determined by a judicious use of interrogatories.
While we indicated in Monier that the use of interrogatories was
not a necessary condition precedent to discovery, it is clear that
their prior use may be required by the trial judge, in the exercise
of his discretion where, as here, such prior 2 use
will substantially
40 expedite identification of relevant material.

Under both the Illinois and the federal rules the desired

documents must be indicated with reasonable particularity.
Rule 214 requires that the documents be "specified ' ' 403 while
rule 34 requires them to be "designated"404; the terms are synonymous.40 5
Although not the first judicial interpretation of the word
"designated" as used in rule 34,406 Judge Woolsey's "Here it is"
40 7
touchstone, delineated in United States v. American Optical Co.,
was the basis of a series of strict judicial interpretations of sufficient designation under rule 34. The situation maintained until
48
United States v. United States Alkali Export Association, Inc. 1
In 1946, when amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were considered, most federal courts followed Judge Woolsey's strict construction of designation. However, the Advisory
Committee did not propose any amendment to change the word

"designated."

Rather, it expressed its disapproval of the strict

construction and supported the propriety of the more liberal
400 See Note, People ex rel. General Motors v. Bua: Discovery Sanctions
- The Problem of Overkill, 1 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 325 (1968).
Compare Sorensen, Comment on People ex rel. General Motors v. Nicholas
J. Bua, Judge, 48 CmiI. BAR REc. 124 (1967), with Pavalon & Harte, Two
Responses to Comment by Howard C. Sorensen on People ex rel. General
Motors v. Nicholas J. Bua, Judge, 48 CHI. BAR REc. 211 (1967).
40137 Ill.2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967).
402 Id. at 194, 226 N.E.2d at 14.
403
404

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, §214 (1967).
FED. R. Civ. P. 34.

(2d ed. 1942).
Eg "'Designated' documents, etc., are those which can be identified with some reasonable degree of particularity. It was surely not in405

MERRIAM-WEBSTER NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

400E

tended by the use of the word 'designated' to permit a roving inspection
of a promiscuous mass of documents...
"
Kenealy V. Texas Co., 29 F.
Supp. 502, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
407 2 F.R.D. 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
I hold that such designation in a motion under Rule 34 must be
sufficiently precise in respect of each document or item of evidence
sought to enable the defendant to go to his files and, without difficulty,
to pick the document or other item requested out and to turn to the
plaintiff saying 'Here it is.'
That is the touchstone in such motions as these.
Id. at 536.
408 7 F.R.D. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
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interpretation which allowed designation by category. °9 The
Advisory Committee relied on two United States Supreme Court
cases (although not dealing with motions under rule 34) holding
a notice pursuant to a state statute, to produce before a grand
jury, documents related to any business or dealings between certain parties in a certain time period, proper 410 ; and a grand jury
subpoena, commanding the production of communications between named parties in a certain time period relating to a num411
ber of business matters, proper.
In United States v. United States Alkali Export Association,

Inc., Judge Rifkind adopted the minority position and that of
the Advisory Committee. He stated:
'[I]t is more the purpose of the rule that definite matters which
are material and about which information is desired be designated
rather than certain books be designated
which may or may not
412
contain the information desired.'

In the federal courts at the present time, designation by cate413

gory is acceptable so long as the category is sufficiently defined

4 14
to enable the party to know what documents he should produce.
Any previous questions regarding the sufficiency of speci-

fying by category under the Illinois rules have been resolved by
Justice Underwood in Monier v. Chamberlain.41 5 Justice Underwood stated:
409
An objection has been made that the word 'designated' in Rule
34 has been construed with undue strictness in some district court cases
so as to require great and impracticable specificity in the description
of documents, papers, books, etc., sought to be inspected. The Committee, however, believes that no amendment is needed, and that the proper
meaning of 'designated' as requiring specificity has already been delineated by the Supreme Court.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF
THE UNITED STATES (1946), 5 F.R.D. 433, 463 (1946).
410 Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541 (1908).
411 Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928).
412 F.R.D. at 258.
413
The trend of the law has been to construe liberally Rule 34's
designation requirement. Some courts, including early cases in this
district, had required specification to the extent that the possessor could
'go to his files and, without difficulty, to pick the document or other
item requested out and turn to the plaintiff saying "Here it is." ' [citation
omitted].
Recent opinions tend to reject this view and instead order discovery of documents relating to a specific subject matter, if the subject or
category has been designated with some 'reasonable degree of particularity.'
This court views the latter trend as more consistent with the
wide latitude that courts should give to discovery proceedings under
the federal rules.
Houdry Process Corp. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 24 F.R.D. 58,
63 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
414 "Under the issue of specifically designating the desired documents
I think a motion for their production is sufficiently specific if the desired
documents are designated by categories which from the nature of the case
enable a reasonable man to know what documents he should produce."
Frank v. Tinicum Metal Co., 11 F.R.D. 83, 85 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
415 35 Ill.2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
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The rule [now rule 214] provides for discovery of 'specified'
material, and the degree of specificity required is the subject of
vigorous argument. Basically, the question is whether each document or individual item must be particularly described and identified by the moving party, or whether it is sufficient to request production of such material by groups or categories of similar items.
The specificity requirement of the rule is there for two purposes:
to provide a reasonable description of the items requested, enabling
those from whom discovery is sought to know what is being demanded of them, and to aid the trial court in ascertaining whether
the requested material is exempted or privileged from discovery.
What will suffice as a reasonable description may well vary from
case to case depending on the circumstances of each, but we believe
that designation by category ordinarily is sufficient for these purposes. . . . No instance in the portions of the order now being
reviewed is pointed out to us, nor do we believe there are any, in
which the description of the requested material is so inadequate as
to leave defendant with any real uncertainty regarding what is and
what is not included. Requiring minute particularization of each
document sought might well unduly lengthen the discovery process
by enabling the parties to engage in dilatory practices. Concerning
the portions of the order before us, we believe that the categorical
designations appearing in each paragraph thereof are sufficient for
the purposes sought to be achieved by the specificity requirement
of Rule 17, and that each of the enumerated categories calls for
the production of documents which 'relate to the merits of the
by the rule and intimated as
matter in litigation', as contemplated
416
proper on the earlier appeal herein.
Medical Examinations
In any action in which the mental or physical condition of
a party is in controversy, an order directing the party to submit
to a medical examination may be obtained, upon notice and mo-

tion showing "good cause," under both the Illinois417 and federal
418

rules.
The propriety of the action in regard to a plaintiff has
42 0
4 19
and in the federal courts.
already been settled in Illinois
The issue of requiring a defendant to submit to a medical examination has not been raised in Illinois, but the United States

Supreme Court, in Schlagenhauf v. Holder4 21 held that federal
Rule 35 applies to plaintiffs and defendants equally.

A party's

416 Id. at 356-57, 221 N.E.2d at 414-15.
417 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §215 (1967).
In addition to medical examination ordered upon
418 FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
motion by a party to the suit, both the Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §215

(d)

(1967),

and the federal, e.g., DISTRICT COURT, N.D. ILL. Civ. R. 20,

courts, may in their discretion order an impartial medical examination. "We
believe that the appointment of an impartial medical expert by the court in
the exercise of its sound discretion is an equitable and forward-looking technique for promoting the fair trial of a lawsuit." Scott v. Spanjer Bros.,
298 F.2d 928, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1962).
419 People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 10 Ill.2d 288, 139 N.E.2d 780
(1957).
420 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
421379 U.S. 104 (1964).
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employee cannot be ordered to submit to a medical examination
under the federal rule 422 but may be so ordered under the Illinois
rule providing for examination of "a party or of a person in his
42
custody or legal control.1 3
The Illinois rule as well as the federal rule require "good
cause" and specify that the mental or physical condition of the
party be "in controversy." Both "good cause" and the fact of
the medical condition being "in controversy" must be affirmatively shown by the movant. The sufficiency of the showings
are decided upon the particular facts of the examination
sought.424

Under the federal rule there is no time limitation in which
to move for an order for a medical examination. Under the
Illinois rule, a time limit has been imposed due to the provision
for delivering to the examined party a copy of the report of the
42

examination.

5

In Illinois, the rule specifically provides: "The order shall
... designate the examining physician. 426 The federal rule, on
422

1962).

See Kropp v. General Dynamics Corp., 202 F. Supp. 207 (E.D. Mich.

423 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §215(a)
(1967). 1967 Proposed Amendments, Rule 35(a), 43 F.R.D. 211, 257, adds similar language.
424 They [the "good cause" and "in controversy" requirements] are
not met by mere conclusory allegations of the pleadings - nor by
mere relevance to the case - but require an affirmative showing by
the movant that each condition as to which the examination is sought
is really and genuinely in controversy and that good cause exists for
ordering each particular examination. Obviously, what may be good
cause for one type of examination may not be so for another. The
ability of the movant to obtain the desired information by other means
is also relevant.
Rule 35, therefore, requires discriminating application by the trial
judge, who must decide, as an initial matter in every case, whether the
party requesting a mental or physical examination or examinations
as adequately demonstrated the existence of the Rule's requirements
of 'in controversy' and 'good cause,' which requirements, as the Court
of Appeals in this case itself recognized, are necessarily related. 321
F.2d, at 51. This does not, of course, mean that the movant must prove
his case on the merits in order to meet the requirements for a mental
or physical examination. Nor does it mean that an evidentiary hearing is required in all cases. This may be necessary in some cases, but
in other cases the showing could be made by affidavits or other usual
methods short of a hearing. It does mean, though, that the movant
must produce sufficient information, by whatever means, so that the
district judge can fulfill his function mandated by the Rule.
Of course, there are situations where the pleadings alone are sufficient to meet these requirements. A plaintiff in a negligence action
who asserts mental or physical injury. . places that mental or physical
injury clearly in controversy and provides the defendant with good cause
for an examination to determine the existence and extent of such asserted injury. This is not only true as to a plaintiff, but applies equally
to defendant who asserts his mental or physical condition as a defense to
a claim, such as, for example, where insanity is asserted as a defense
to a divorce action.
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 118-19 (1964).
425 See Jackson v. Whittinghill, 39 Ill. App. 2d 315, 188 N.E.2d 337
(1963).
426 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §215(a)
(1967).
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the other hand, merely states that "[t]he order

. . .

shall specify

. . . the person or persons by whom [the examination] is to be

made. ' 427 The federal rule provision has been held not to require the naming of the doctor who is to conduct the examina-

tion. 428 In both Illinois and the federal courts the movant may
429 If
suggest the examiner, but the court need not appoint him.

the person to be examined objects to the suggested examiner,
good reason must be adduced to sustain the objection. Examination of a woman by a male doctor, when the woman has previously been treated by male doctors of her own choice, has been
held insufficient reason for objection.410 Nor has the fact that
the plaintiff must travel from the state in which he resides to
the state in which he filed the suit been sufficient431 While there
are no reported cases in Illinois on this latter objection, the rules
do provide that "[a] party or person shall not be required to
'432
travel an unreasonable distance for the examination.
Normally the examination is held at the convenience of the
party to be examined, 43 3 and he is allowed to have his own physician present at the examination.4 3 4 He is not entitled, however,
43 5
to the presence of his attorney. 1
R. Civ. P. 35 (a).
is therefore ordered that the plaintiff submit to the examination moved by the defendant on July 25, 1944, in the Buffalo General
Memorial Hospital, or some other suitable hospital in Buffalo, as the
parties may agree upon, at such time as may be mutually agreeable
between the parties; and that such examination shall be made by a
physician or surgeon of acknowledged professional standing, skill and
experience, on behalf of the defendant...
Klein v. Yellow Cab Co., 7 F.R.D. 169, 170 (N.D. Ohio 1944) (supplemental
opinion). But see Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1955),
where although the order was held invalid on other grounds, it was stated
that the order was also invalid since it failed to name the physician who
was to conduct the examination.
427 FED.
428
It

429 "The court may refuse to order examination by the physician sug-

gested but in that event shall permit the party seeking the examination
to suggest others." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §215(a) (1967).
[I]t is obvious that a defendant seeking a physical examination of a
plaintiff has no absolute right to the choice of his own physician ...
It naturally rests within the discretion of the Court to appoint
the physician chosen by the defendant, if it is felt that the interests
of justice will best be served in that manner.
Gitto v. Societa Anonima Di Navigazione, Genova, 27 F. Supp. 785, 786
(E.D.N.Y. 1939).
430

431

Gale v. National Transp. Co., 7 F.R.D. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
Plaintiff offers no reason for his inability to come to New York

other than the statement that he is financially and physically unable to
do so. A Georgia forum would have offered a more convenient, speedier,
and possibly less expensive forum. Plaintiff, however, chose to bring the
action in this forum. Plaintiff cannot now complain that he should
not be examined in this forum.
Pierce v. Brovig, 16 F.R.D. 569, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
432 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §215 (a) (1967).
433
See Randolph v. McCoy, 29 F. Supp. 978 (S.D. Tex. 1939). But
see case cited note 431 supra, as to when the party to be examined objects
to traveling to forum of his choice.
434 See Klein v. Yellow Cab Co., 7 F.R.D. 169 (N.D. Ohio 1944) (supplemental opinion).
435 Dziwanoski v. Ocean Carriers Corp., 26 F.R.D. 595 (D. Md. 1960).
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The language of the federal rule provides that the medical
examination may entail more than one doctor. 43 6 The Illinois
rule, on the other hand, refers to a single physician throughout
and may therefore be interpreted to limit discovery to exami-

nation by a single doctor. "[B]ut such a limitation is wholly
inconsistent with the realities of modern medical practice.
Where specialists from various branches of medicine are required, there is nothing in the rule to prevent the court from

ordering examination by all of them. '1 3 7 The federal courts
have ordered examinations by more than one doctor on the basis
of both the language of rule 3548 and the nature of modern
medical practice, even though, by the court's own admission,

there is some confusion regarding the propriety of this prac43 9
tice.
The federal courts have been reluctant to order a party
to submit to more than one medical examination. 440 Second

examinations have nevertheless been granted when the courtappointed physician failed to cover all of the plaintiff's injuries, 4 41 or when there have been changes in the physical condi436 FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a) uses the language: "[Tihe person or persons
by whom [the examination] is to be made."
437

W.

BARRON &

A.

HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§822,

at 483 (Rules ed. 1961).
438 "A reading of Rule 35(a) does not indicate an intent to establish
a single examination limitation, and where alleged injuries fall into two
entirely separate areas of medical specialization, examinations by practitioners in such fields are held to be authorized under the Rule." Marshall
v. Peters, 31 F.R.D. 238, 239 (S.D. Ohio 1962).
439
Because there seems to be some confusion concerning the right
to have more thaa one medical expert participate in the examination, a
supplemental examination will be ordered in this case as a part of the
original examination.
Ordinarily the examination under Order of Court (like that of
August 9, 1962) should be made by the designated examining physician
with the assistance of such other specialists, technicians and assistants
as may necessarily be required in the judgment of the examining
physician and in light of the complaints of the plaintiff. This examination should be conducted in accordance with current medical practice in
the diagnosis of similar cases not involving litigation. The examination
should cover all claims of injury being made by the plaintiff. More than
one person may participate therein [citations omitted].
If defendants choose a competent physician to make the examination, such other persons may be designated to assist as would be required in a similar examination for diagnosis in the ordinary course
of the medical practice.
Little v. Howey, 32 F.R.D. 322-23 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
440See, e.g., Rutherford v. Alben, 1 F.R.D. 277 (S.D. W.Va. 1940). See
also Little v. Howey, 32 F.R.D. 322 (W.D. Mo. 1963), wherein the court allowed a second examination to enable the defendant to have plaintiff examined by another specialist, which he was not certain he could do at the time
of the original examination. But the court implied that now that the confusion had been cleared, parties would not be able to obtain a second examination for this reason.
441 Mayer v. Illinois N. Ry., 324 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1963), ce'rt. denied,
377 U.S. 907 (1964).
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tion of the party since the first examination.442 "It seems fair
to say that under certain circumstances, a second examination

is authorized by the rule, but that the court should require a
stronger showing of necessity before it will order such repeated
examination."-43
The cases in Illinois concerning the number of medical examinations allowed are unclear as to the basis of decision. The

cases prior to Noren v. Dempsey44 4 were clouded with the question of whether or not the court could even properly order a

medical examination.445 In a subsequent case, 4 "6the defendant
moved for the additional examination six days before the date
for trial, thereby making it impossible to comply with the requirements of former rule 17-1 (3) for delivering of reports of
the examination to the party who was examined. 447 However,
in Buckler v. Sinclair Refining Company,448 when a mistrial was
declared, the defendant, who had obtained four examinations of
plaintiff, again moved for an additional examination. The mo-

tion was denied.
The provisions of former Illinois Rule 17-1 (3) concerning
delivery of reports of the examination to the party examined
have not been substantially changed in rule 215 .4
In Harris
442 "Neither is there any sound reason that would limit a party to one
examination of another party. The rule very wisely says that there must
be good cause shown before an examination can be ordered." Vopelak v.
Williams, 42 F.R.D. 387, 389 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
443 Id.
444 10 Ili.2d 288, 139 N.E.2d 780 (1957).
445 See Peoria, D. & E. Ry. v. Rice, 144 Ill. 227, 33 N.E. 951 (1893);
Chicago & E. I. R.R. v. Holland, 122 Ill. 461, 13 N.E. 145 (1887).
446 Jackson v. Whittinghill, 39 Ill. App. 2d 315, 188 N.E.2d 337 (1963),
wherein it was stated:
It is obvious that the provisions of Paragraph 3 [of rule 17-1] would
have been violated unless the case were removed from the trial call.
The motions for continuance and additional medical examination were
made six days before the date set for trial. The defendant had already
obtained one medical examination of plaintiff. Apparently defendant's
choice of an examiner was a poor one. He used a general practitioner,
then decided examination by an orthopedic surgeon was desirable. It is
obvious that an orthopedic problem was involved here. The purpose of
Rule 17-1 is not to provide an expert witness for a litigant. Its purpose
is one of discovery. The defendant was furnished medical information
by plaintiff well in advance of trial and also obtained an examination.
The defendant might very well have used a qualified orthopedic. The
lack of judgment in this regard should not prejudice plaintiff. The trial
court has broad discretion in matters of motions under 17-1 and for
continuance. Under the circumstances here presented the court acted
well within its discretion in denying both motions.
Id. at 323-24, 188 N.E.2d at 341. See also Buckler v. Sinclair Refining Co.,
68 Ill. App. 2d 283, 216 N.E.2d 14 (1966).
447 Reports had to be delivered "[w]ithin twenty days after completion
of the examination, and in no event later than ten days before trial ..
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §101.17-1(3) (1965).
448 68 Ill. App. 2d 283, 216 N.E.2d 14 (1966).
449 Twenty days after completion of the examination has been changed
to 21 days. Ten days before trial has been changed to 14 days. Compare
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §215(c) (1967) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
§101.17-1(3) (1965).
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v. Minardi,45 0 the defendant obtained a medical examination of
the plaintiff on July 13, 1965 and submitted a report of the examination to plaintiff's attorney on July 16, five days before the
trial. On appeal the Illinois appellate court held that the admission of the testimony of the examining physician over the
plaintiff's objections constituted reversible error, since the de-

fendant had not submitted the report in accordance with the
mandatory requirements of rule 17-1 (3).
However, in Lilegdon v. Hanuska,45 1 a different division of

the same court held that the application of the sanction of exclu-

sion in rule 17-1 (3) for failure to deliver a medical report within
the time prescribed in the rule is discretionary, not mandatory.
In that case the medical report was delivered to the plaintiffs'
counsel on the day the case was assigned to trial, one day before
the case actually commenced. The appellate court found that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the examining physician to testify. The court stated:
Out of the presence of the jury, the trial court considered at length
the arguments of counsel, the mandatory or discretionary character
of the rule, the events preceding the trial, including the dismissal
of the case and its reinstatement and return to the active trial calendar, and the element of surprise to plaintiffs. The court finally
permitted Dr. Petty to testify, stating, 'Incidentally, I can't help
but say, although there is a claim of surprise, there has been no
announcement here of any action that has been taken that prevents
the plaintiff from being in a position to meet whatever the452report
may contain, or whatever testimony may be forthcoming.'

The federal rule does not require mandatory delivery of
the report of the examination. It does provide that the report
shall be delivered "[i]f requested by the person examined...

,,413

Rule 35 further provides:
By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so
ordered or by taking the deposition of the examiner, the party examined waives any privilege he may have in that action or any
other involving the same controversy, regarding the testimony of
every other person who has examined or may thereafter454examine
him in respect of the same mental or physical condition.
The courts have held that a tendering of the report of the examination is not sufficient to waive the examined party's privilege, 45 5 nor is delivery of the report pursuant to court order.4

56

450 74

11. App. 2d 262, 220 N.E.2d 39 (1966).
Ill.
App. 2d 262, 229 N.E.2d 314 (1967).
452 Id. at 272, 229 N.E.2d at 319.
453 FED. R. Civ. P. 35(b) (1).
45185

454 FED. R. CIV. P.

35 (b) (2).

Sher v. DeHaven, 199 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 936 (1953).
456 Benning v. Phelps, 249 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1957).
Contra, Weir v.
Simmons, 233 F. Supp. 657 (D. Neb. 1964).
455
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SANCTIONS

Both the Illinois" 7 and federa45 6 rules provide sanctions for
failure to comply with rules and orders of the courts pertaining
to discovery. The Illinois rule additionally provides sanctions
for abuse of the rules of discovery. 459 Rules pertaining to sanctions refer to all other rules regarding discovery. The sanctions
provided in each instance are drastic.4 6 0 However, without such
4 1
sanctions the procedure for discovery would be ineffectual.

The Illinois and federal rules pertaining to sanctions clearly
distinguish between rules and orders. The Illinois rule provides
sanctions if a party unreasonably refuses to comply with rules,
or fails to comply with orders. The federal rule provides sanctions if a party wilfully fails to comply with rules or refuses to
comply with orders. Therefore, a party who initiates discovery
without court order must demonstrate, under the rules, that the
other party's failure to comply with the rules is unreasonable or
46 2

wilful.

The rules provide for such sanctions as staying the proceedings, 4 6 3

debarring the offending party from filing further plead-

457 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §219 (1967).
See also ILL. RFV. STAT.
ch. 110A, §209 (1967), which provides for assessment of costs and attorneys' fees, for failure of a party to attend a deposition, which that party
noticed, or for failure of a party to serve a subpoena to compel a witness
to appear at a deposition which that party noticed.
458 FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
See also FED. R. Civ. P. 30(g).
459 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10A, §219(d) (1967) provides for imposition
of any of the enumerated sanctions if a party wilfully obtains or attempts to obtain information by improper means of discovery, or information to which he is not entitled. Further, the court under this rule may
suppress information obtained through abuse of discovery.
"It [rule
219(d)] extends the sanctions provided for in the new rule to general
abuse of the discovery rules." Committee Comments following ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110A, §219(d)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967).
The rule itself,
and certainly its application, raise numerous due process questions. Assuming an intentional abuse, such as taking the deposition of a witness
pursuant to subpoena without notice, aside from suppressing the transcript
of testimony and providing for costs to the witness, the imposition of a fine
or imprisonment and the assessment of reasonable attorney's fees against
the offending person or party would seem the extent of the sanctions compatible with due process.
460 "The dismissal of an action with prejudice is a drastic remedy
and should be applied only in extreme circumstances." Bon Air Hotel, Inc.
v. Time, Inc., 376 F.2d 118, 121 (5th Cir. 1967).
461 C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §90 (1963).
462
Although we are by no means sure we would agree with the
proposition that a pleading may not be struck for contumacious failure
of a party to comply with a subpoena duces tecum issued pursuant to
Rule 45(d), [citations omitted], we find it unnecessary to decide this.
The proceedings in Judge MacMahon's chambers on October 21 can properly be regarded as including an oral motion and order under Rule 34
for the production of the papers designated in the subpoena, and those
on October 22 as including an oral motion and order under Rule 37(b)
determining Penn's recalcitrance.
Jones v. Uris Sales Corp., 373 F.2d 644, 647-48 (2d Cir. 1967).
463 ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 110A, §219(c) (i) (1967).

The John Marshall Journalof Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 2:22

ings, 464 debarring the maintaining of a claim or defense,4

5

de-

4 66

entering default judgments or
barring a witness's testimony
dismissing the suit with or without prejudice,4 67 and striking
any portion of the pleading. 468

However, the imposed sanction

must be limited to the issue to which the refusal or failure relates. The rules further provide for the imposition of a fine
and/or imprisonment 4 69 and the assessing of costs and reasonable attorney's fees.4 7 0 They also enable the court to enter any

other order which is "just"4 '1 in addition to the sanction actually
specified.
The Illinois and federal rules require, in order for the stringent sanctions to be imposed, that the court must either find that
the failure to comply with the rules or the orders of court, or

even with both, is of such a nature as to affront the dignity of
the court,472 or must be able to reasonably presume that the failure to comply is an admission that there is no merit to the claim
or defense to which the refusal relates.4 7 3 To impose the more
stringent sanctions available in the absence of such findings
would raise serious constitutional questions of the denial of due
process.
In considering the due process question, the United States
Supreme Court stated in Societe InternationalePour Participa474
tions Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers:
The provisions of Rule 37 which are here involved must be read
in light of the provisions of the Fifth Amendment that no person
shall be deprived of property without due process of law ...
FT]here are constitutional limitations upon the power of courts,
even in aid of their own valid processes, to dismiss an action without affording47 a5 party the opportunity for a hearing on the merits
of his cause.

In considering the same question, the Illinois Supreme Court
476
stated in People ex rel. General Motors Corporation V. Bua:
464
465

Id. at (c) (ii).

FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2) (ii) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §219(c) (iii)
(1967).
466 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §219 (e) (iv) (1967).

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §219(c)
467 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2) (iii)
(v) (1967).
468 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2)(iii)ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §219(c)
(vi) (1967).
See also
469 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (1); FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2) (iv).
FED. R. Civ. P. 45(f).

FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a), (c); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §219(b), (c)
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §219(c) (1967). United States v. Costello,
222 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955).
470

(1967).
471

472 Jones v. Uris Sales Corp., 373 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Hawkins v.
Potter, 44 Ill. App. 2d 314, 194 N.E.2d 672 (1963).
473 FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (b) (2) (i).
McMullen v. Travelers Ins. Co., 278

F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1960).
474357 U.S. 197 (1958).
475 Id. at 209.
476 37

Ill.2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967).
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[W]e have not heretofore recognized the inherent power of a
court to strike pleadings and enter defaults as punishment for contempt. [A] court possessing plenary power to punish for contempt, may not, on the theory of punishing for contempt, summarily deprive a party of all right to defend an action.
... [Illinois] also rejected an argument that the sanction was
appropriate on the theory that the failure to produce documents
raised a presumption that they would
reveal information showing
4 77
the liability of the disobedient party.
The court took the position that the availability of such sanctions must be provided for by the legislature. (Such is the
case.) Yet the permissible presumption that the refusal to produce material evidence is an admission of the want of merit in
the claim or defense still leaves open the question of whether
due process is violated by defaulting a party, despite good faith
7
efforts, for failure to comply with a pretrial discovery order. 1
In Bon Air Hotel, Inc. V. Time, Inc.,4 7 9 the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed a dismissal order entered against
a bankrupt corporate plaintiff for failure to produce for deposition a specifically named officer of the corporation. The
court avoided "the uncertain footing of a specific legal ruling on"
the due process question in light of facts which showed good faith
in attempting to comply with the court order, choosing rather
to base its decision "on the broader, firmer ground that in the
factual context . ..present, it was an error of judicial discretion ... to dismiss the complaint. ' 48 0 The court, first questioning
whether the person ordered produced was an officer of the plaintiff, stated:
This record compels the conclusion that [plaintiff's] failure to comply was due to inability brought about neither by its own conduct
nor by circumstances within its control. The plaintiff was in bankruptcy and the real party at interest, the trustee, did not control
Coven. Counsel for plaintiff even hired a nationally known service
which specialized in locating missing persons in an endeavor to
locate Coven. One might wonder what more could be done .48
The courts require certainty
record before applying the more
an order denying a party a trial
giving the party adequate time

of notice and specificity in the
stringent sanctions. To enter
on the merits without clearly
to comply under the circum-

7 Id.

at 189-90, 226 N.E.2d at 12.
Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time,
Inc., 376 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1967).
479 376 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1967).
48OM. at 121.
478

481 Id. In Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et
Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) the Court determined that
striking the plaintiff's complaint for failure to comply with a production order, in light of partial production and a specific finding of a good-faith attempt to comply, was an inappropriate sanction. The Court did not answer
the due process question or indicate what an appropriate sanction would be.
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stances, and specifying what is expected of him would also raise
the due process question. The Illinois Supreme Court, in People
ex rel. General Motors CorporationV. Bua,482 held that one paragraph of one order was not specific enough in its enumeration

of the documents to be produced.

The court found that:

While flexibility is necessary in discovery, due process requires
that production orders be sufficiently specific to inform a person of
his obligation thereunder, especially in light4 of
the extreme sanc3

tions available for a violation of such order.

The court described the paragraph as "a catch-all demand for
the production of documents without the slightest degree of
specificity.' '484
In Johnson v. Thomas,48 5 the court reversed a dismissal
order of December 16, 1964, for failure to appear, pursuant to
court order for deposition. The court stated:
As we have pointed out, the order of June 24, 1964, merely
provided that the plaintiff was given 60 days to present herself to
defendant's attorney, at some time to be agreed on, and have her
deposition taken. There is no indication that there was any time
agreed on, nor is there anything further in the record with reference to that particular order. The order of October 13, even if we
would consider it a proper order in spite of the omissions in the
notice, provided that the plaintiff must appear and give her deposition within 60 days. There is no indication of the person before
whom the deposition should be taken, nor the time; therefore, it
can be said that the orders are lacking in the specificity necessary
as a predicate for the imposition of sanctions for failure of compliance.486

The courts have hesitated to apply the more stringent sanctions even in extreme situations. In order to avoid precipitous
application of the sanctions, the courts often extend opportunity
48 7
after opportunity for compliance to the recalcitrant party.
Even after entry of an order providing for a sanction, the courts
appear willing to vacate if the recalcitrant party offers to comply. 4 8 Indeed, the courts have been subject to criticism for
failure to apply the available sanctions more fully and fre482 37 Il.2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967).
483
484

Id. at 195, 226 N.E.2d at 15.
Id. at 194, 226 N.E.2d at 15.

48575

Ill.
App. 2d 407, 221 N.E.2d 44 (1966).

Id. at 410, 221 N.E.2d at 46.
48 7
See Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 376 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1967);
Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 956 (1965); Hawkins v. Potter, 44 Ill. App. 2d 314, 194
N.E.2d 672 (1963). See also Stickler v. McCarthy, 37 I1l.2d 48, 224 N.E.
2d 827 (1967), in which it was held that the striking of the defendant's answer was an abuse of discretion because the defendant was not given sufficient time to file a response to plaintiff's motion.
488 "Neither in his written motion to set aside the default, nor in the
oral presentation of it, did Janney or his counsel offer his appearance for a
deposition if the default were set aside." Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v.
Dolman, 333 F.2d 257, 269 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 956 (1965);
Goldman v. Checker Taxi Co., 84 Ill.
App. 2d 318, 228 N.E.2d 177 (1967).
46
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quently. 819 But in view of the imminent due process question,
such hesitancy is understandable.

489 Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 480, 494-96 (1958) ; Developments in the Law - Discovery, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 940, 990-91 (1960). A case such as Stickler v. McCarthy, 37 Ill.2d 48,
224 N.E.2d 827 (1967), supports the criticism. In a lengthy analysis and
description of the repeated and deliberate failure of the defendant to comply
with rules and orders, the appellate court stated:
The judge demonstrated a competent grasp of the issues. He does not
appear to have been vindictive, arbitrary, capricious or abrupt. He
treated both sides courteously, considerately and fairly. He postponed
hearings for the convenience of the defendant's counsel, he placed his
jury room at the disposal of the parties and made himself quickly
available to rule upon their disputes. He read the transcripts of the
depositions, listened to arguments and made his decisions.
What the judge did was to insist upon compliance with his orders.
Stickler v. McCarthy, 64 Ill. App. 2d 1, 17, 212 N.E. 723, 731 (1965), modified, 37 Ill.2d 48, 224 N.E.2d 827 (1967). The appellate court affirmed the
trial court's order. The supreme court, with little comment on the facts, reversed the appellate court and the trial court on the grounds that the
defendant was not given a chance to file a written reply to the motion to
enter judgment for failure to comply with rules and orders of court, despite the fact that the defendant was given several opportunities to present
his position in oral argument in the presence of the court reporter.

